Legal Notice For Administrative Hearing

New York State Office Of Children And
Family Service Child Abuse and Maltreatment Register
P.O. BOX 4480 Albany New York 12204
Office # 1-800-342-3720


This affidavit is to correct misstated information and falsely
reported information by case workers employed at Department of Family
and Children Services. Those statements made in the allegation against me
were made with the intention of portraying me to be irresponsible and create
the aura that T am unstable


The only barrier to this case seems to be the lack of understanding
the facts and the mutated data case workers have injected into
the files by their interpretation of what they have read. Not actual
facts even though they have been available to review and verify. I am
and continue to be quite upset that my attempts to correct the
numerous mistakes have been ignored. This case is based upon mistaken
identity which was easy to do considering my mother and I have the
same first and middle name- but not the same last name

1. a. States that respondent has a long history of CPS involvement and
of fleeing with her child when she learns of a report to the State
Central Registry.

CORRECTION : This is regarding my mother Winona Grant D.O.B 10/8/1945
who has been the guardian of my son Timothy Grant since his birth. D.O.B 1/30/1989
She has evaded CPS workers 250 times after reports were made regarding her
neglecting my son.

2, In the same paragraph it states that I failed to provide adequate
guardianship and proper supervision of said children and failing to
receive necessary medical and educational services.

CORRECTION: I did not have guardianship of my son my mother did
and she failed to provide care to him not me. It is hard to believe that
case workers did not know this information is regarding my mother and
not me since the dates of the reports were on the records. And it was
known that my mother had taken my son since birth.

My mother has an extensive history in New York where myself and
siblings were put into foster care since I was 5 years old. My mother
snatched my first born child and ran off after attaining legal
guardianship of him because I gave birth at 15 years old. I was never
allowed to be his mother and through the years my mother used various
aliases and claimed to be his mother not grandmother. Many times
reports were made of her neglecting my son, she would run off state to
state avoiding cps until they finally caught up with them in 2004
because mv son was seen running naked and she was very ill

At that time I had not known where they were and had no legal
responsibility since he was a day old. She lied again claiming to be
someone named Wendy and saying she was his mother. The court filed
abandonment charges on me and a protection order to stay away from my
son when I had nothing to do with how he and her were found. I wish I
could see my son - but don't know how to do this since she messed
everything up with her lies.

My son aged out and my parental rights were never terminated with
him as some of the case workers have put in record and used to take my
youngest daughter from me. My child is in foster care because of
mistakes of information mutated and my mother's history injected as my
history. I at first was nice and cooperated with case workers- but
they seemed to take what I said and twist it to suit their agenda of
recruiting my child in for services.

3. Richland County Child protection Services April 2009 report.

CORRECTION: This agency found the burn to be an accident not
intentional abuse or neglect.

4. a. States my child was filthy and dirty and respondent displayed
erratic behavior at the hospital.

CORRECTION: My child fell into a fire pit and no I did not waste time
to go change her clothing and wash her up due to the concern for getting
my child to be seen as quickly to care for her injuries. As for the erratic
behavior 1 had a severe headache and asked for some ice for my head and
the nurse flipped out and refused to give me ice. Which caused me to
throw up due to the nausea caused by not putting ice to my head.
Ohio became involved after my child accidentally tripped over the
neighbors fire pit landing hands down and she was hurt - immediately
she was taken to be treated at the emergency room. Her hands have
healed as I did follow all instructions for the care and appointments
that were made regarding this issue. Ohio dismissed its case against
me and found the incident to be an accident not child abuse Of course
they did begin to have other non abuse/non neglecting related concerns.

5. b. States I was observed in August 2009 to have punched my daughter
in the chest and forcibly yanking her by her arm. Then in the days that
followed observed to be inadequately supervising said child where she
walked into the shelter and the road


CORRECTION: Had such incident occurred it would have been the duty
of the worker who claims to have seen such incident to immediately take
said child from me and take her to be examined by an emergency room
Doctor to assure no injuries were caused. This would be evidence of such
incident actually occurring which it did not. A DHS office is usually full
of people and there are no other witnesses to such incident been seen by
anyone else- highly unlikely. My child at no time while at the shelter did
she walk into the road this was a fabricated lie if ever said by anyone
working at the shelter. I was never alerted as claimed


6. c. States on September 20091 left New york where I lived to move
back to Ohio and then left Ohio to flee from CPS coming to remove
my child due to concerns of physical abuse, my mental health, and
developmental delays and my inability to control said child's
behaviors.


CORRECTION: I own a home in Ohio where we live and only visited
New York T have a career as a truck driver and did not flee because of
any other reason then a job came up to deliver out of state, yes I of course
took my daughter with me. There is no evidence aside from these broad
statements without any validation from independent sources regarding
either physical abuse or me having any mental health issues. Last time I
checked the reporting case worker did not have a medical degree to
evaluate mental health conditions. If I seemed uncooperative it would be
natural to assume any parent would be upset with anyone trying to abduct
their child under these false pretenses and force upon said parent services
that were not needed nor wanted. Save the county money and find those
who do want your services instead of trying to force them on those who
have no need for them.


I agreed to the offer of services at first as it sounded like a
good idea- but then it became obvious that it was not to just help my
child with speech delays, and I needed to work so I could pay my
bills. I told the case worker I had to go to new york for a job I
attained but I would be back after wards. I have a trucking company and
Ohio has no jobs available in this line of work right now.


Any logical person could understand I needed to go it just couldn't
be helped. Speech therapy wont pay my bills and my child was only 3
when she was assessed by a non professional non native person who only
met her for 30 minutes and then claimed she was nonverbal or delayed.
Ohio got mad when I declined the services offer stating I was going to
New York- so they worked it out behind my back to remove my child from
me in New York- there was NO IMMINENT DANGER and the order was based
upon fabricated statements or using my mother's history as mine
I don't want to be a thorn in your side -1 just want my Child back
home and us able to pick up the shattered pieces of our lives after
the help given to us by this agency. I understand you personally have
done nothing to me-1 am not angry with you per say - but can become
so if you are like the others and refuse to really help me get this
done and over with. I hope you can assist me in getting these facts
mentioned corrected in the file accumulating papers as my case remains
open. I have evidence that I'm including to show you and verify the facts
I claim have been distorted and mutated in the record. Can you please
change the misstated things to be factually correct?


7. There have been false allegation from workers claiming I have a 20 year
drug habit


CORRECTION: There is no evidence of such history and for mv Job I
am randomly drug tested which I have never failed a test yet. This is
slander and defamation of character for such statements to be reported
without proof of such being anything but a fabricated lie used to
manipulate the court in keeping my child from me.


8. Visitation was changed from Wednesday to Friday with only a 2 day
advanced notice. I can not change my work schedule without
informing the company 3 weeks in advance of such a change. Case
worker stated if I could not make such arrangements then my
visitations would be terminated


9. Another visitation incident occurred where after driving 1500 miles to
attend a visit I was called 1 /2 an hour before it was scheduled and
informed the visit was canceled due to my child catching pink eye.
See exhibit 1 and 2. The worker asked me over the phone what proof
was needed and I told her nothing written as I have already been
concerned with all the fabrication of documents and false statements
from said worker thus far Exhibit 1 is a letter written about the
canceled visit and exhibit 2 in the meter stamped envelope it was sent
in.

10. Exhibits following are relevant to show proof of my mother's
guardianship of my son and her death notice.


11. I demand the Department of Family and Children Services to return my child to my custody based upon the facts that she was taken for ransom to force me to sign a case plan for services we do not have any need for. My daughter was taken under false allegations whereby case workers injected my mothers history to manipulate the court to believe me to be unstable which is not true. I demand that my child be returned or I be charged for a crime - otherwise this agency has no authority to take custody of said child without my consent which I refuse to grant anyone.


Winona Mae (Palmiotti) Marzocco d.o.b 4/7/73
218 Coul St Mansfield Ohio 44902
Winona 1010.blogspot.com
(419)295-0731

Innocence Destroyed - Part 1 - WARNING: Graphic Content

WARNING: GRAPHIC CONTENT - Investigating the deaths of over 1000 children per year in the custody of various states





WARNING: GRAPHIC CONTENT - Investigating the deaths of over 1000 children per year in the custody of various states






WARNING: GRAPHIC CONTENT - Investigating the deaths of over 1000 children per year in the custody of various states

CPS CASE LAW CASES NO IMMUNTITY FOR STATE ACTORS CPS

Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 514 F.3d 906, (9th Cir. 2008)
Beltrans sued two caseworkers under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, charging constitutional violations in removing child from their custody and attempting to place him under the supervision of the state by fabricating evidence. Court overruled Doe v. Lebbos, and reversed the district court's ruling that defendants were entitled to absolute immunity.


Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, (7th Cir. 2000)
In 1983, three-year old A.D. Brokaw was removed from her parents' home based on allegations of child neglect. After she turned eighteen, she sued her paternal grandfather, aunt, and uncle, alleging that they conspired to violate her constitutional rights by reporting false claims of child neglect. A.D. also sued the various state actors and agencies involved in removing her from her parents' custody. The district court held that A.D.'s suit was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because, in effect, A.D. was challenging the validity of the state removal proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded.

Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999)
"This case involves whether a social worker and a police officer were entitled to qualified immunity, for a coerced entry into a home to investigate suspected child abuse, interrogation of a child, and strip search of a child, conducted without a search warrant and without a special exigency." Can you guess what the answer was? "An unlawful entry or search of a home does not end when the government officials walk across the threshold. It continues as they impose their will on the residents of the home in which they have no right to be."

Chavez v. Board of County Commissioners, 2001-NMCA-065, New Mexico Court of Appeals (2001)
Defendants are deputy sheriffs with the Curry County Sheriff's Department, who were called to assist two social workers from the Children, Youth & Families Department on a "child welfare check" at Plaintiff's home. Plaintiff's son had not been attending elementary school. Thus, one reason for the visit to Plaintiff's home was to investigate suspected truancy or educational neglect. Held: "At the time of entry into Plaintiff's home, it was well-settled that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures and was intended to protect the sanctity of an individual's home and privacy."

Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir. 1997)
Holding that "a state has no interest in protecting children from their parents unless it has some reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse."

Doe v. Gooden, 214 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2000)
School district officials can be liable under 1983 if they are deliberately indifferent to acts committed by a teacher that violate a student's constitutional rights.

Franz v. United States, 707 F 2d 582, US Ct App (1983)
"The undesirability of cultural homogenization would lead us to oppose efforts by the state to assume a greater role in children's development, even if we were confident that the state were capable of doing so effectively and intelligently." A brilliant analysis of the fundamental right to be free of unwarranted state interference between the child-parent bond, in this case stemming from the Witness Protection Program.

Good v. Dauphin County Soc. Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, (3d Cir. 1989)
"[P]hysical entry into the home is the chief evil against which the ... Fourth Amendment is directed," the Court explained, while adding: "It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." No qualified immunity claim to be found here.

Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 335 F.3d 684, (8th Cir.2003)
Waddle, as Chief Juvenile Officer for the Second Circuit of Missouri, effected the removal of 115 boarding students from Heartland Christian Academy . Waddle had obtained ex parte probable-cause state-court orders to remove some of the boarding students, there were no orders of any kind to remove many of the students who were taken from the school. This case is noted for its brilliant analysis of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and immunity as an officer of a juvenile court. The court held that: "any single violation of Heartland's federal constitutional rights in this case would be sufficient to sustain Heartland's claim for injunctive relief under ' 1983."

Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2005)
No qualified immunity in this ' 1983 action for alleged violations of Fourth Amendment rights arising from girl's in-school seizure by a deputy sheriff and s Social Worker Supervisor for the New Mexico Children, Youth, and Families Department ("CYFD"). "We conclude that the Fourth Amendment violation as alleged in this case is both obvious and outrageous."

Kelson v. Springfield, 767 F 2d 651, (9th Cir. 1985)
"Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent establish that a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and society of his or her child. The state's interference with that liberty interest without due process of law is remediable under section 1983."

Lopkof v. Slater, 103 F.3d 144 (10th Cir. 1996) (Unpublished)
Defendants do not dispute that the law was clearly established that a warrantless search of a private residence is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless one of "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" applies. Defendants maintain that because they had "received specific information questioning the safety of children," they acted in an objectively reasonable manner when they entered Lopkoff's private residence. Wrong, and no qualified immunity for these officers.

Loudermilk v. Arpaio, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76819 (D. Ariz. September 27, 2007)
With respect to Plaintiffs' claim based on violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, parents and children have a constitutional right to live together without governmental interference and will not be separated without due process of law except in emergencies. Motion to dismiss by CPS worker and others who coerced entry into home denied.

Mabe v. San Bernardino, 237 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2001)
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, violates the constitutional rights of another person. Whether reasonable cause to believe exigent circumstances existed in a given situation, "and the related questions, are all questions of fact to be determined by a jury." Hence, no immunity for social worker under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

NEW! Michael v. Gresbach, (7th Cir. 2008)
The court held that: "a reasonable child welfare worker would have known that conducting a search of a child's body under his clothes, on private property, without consent or the presence of any other exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, is in direct violation of the child's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches." No qualified immunity for this CPS caseworker! The court also held that the state statute that allowed for "investigations" on private property without a search warrant was itself unconstitutional as applied.

Malik v. Arapahoe County Dept. of Soc. Servs.191 F.3d 1306, (10th Cir. 1999)
"The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 for actions taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Court also held that: "it was clearly established law that, except in extraordinary circumstances, a parent has a liberty interest in familial association and privacy that cannot be violated without adequate pre-deprivation procedures."

Norfleet v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1993)
Court denies qualified immunity to the Human Services Director and caseworker involved because the state obligation to provide adequate medical care, protection, and supervision with respect to children placed in foster care was well established as of 1991.

Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707 (3rd Cir. 1996)
The defendants attempt to avoid the imposition of summary judgment by arguing that, even if their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity should shield them from liability. Qualified immunity is available to state actors in Section 1983 suits if those actors reasonably believed that their conduct was lawful. However, a good faith belief in the legality of conduct is not sufficient. Held: No qualified immunity.

Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 1997)
Holding "a parent has a constitutionally protected right to the care and custody of his children and he cannot be summarily deprived of custody without notice and a hearing except when the children are in imminent danger." No qualified immunity for social worker who removed child not in imminent danger.

Rogers v. County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2007)
Court held: "the rights of families to be free from governmental interference and arbitrary state action are also important. Thus, we must balance, on the one hand, the need to protect children from abuse and neglect and, on the other, the preservation of the essential privacy and liberty interests that families are guaranteed under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution." Section 1983 case reinforces that removal of children from home by caseworker absent either a warrant or exigent circumstances violates those rights, and therefore no qualified immunity applies to caseworker.

Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, (10 Cir. 2003)
Holding no immunity for caseworkers who entered a home lacking either exigency or a warrant, and finding constitutional protection in the right to maintain a family relationship, Court held: "the law is now clearly established that, absent probable cause and a warrant or exigent circumstances, social workers may not enter an individual's home for the purpose of taking a child into protective custody."

Tennenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, (2d Cir. 1999)
"We affirm the judgment insofar as it holds that the medical examination violated the Tenenbaums' and Sarah's procedural due-process rights and Sarah's Fourth Amendment rights and awards damages therefor. . . We conclude, however, that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants' removal of Sarah from school was contrary to the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause and to Sarah's right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment." The Missouri Bar has an informative Courts Bulletin describing the case.

Turner v. Houseman, Docket: 07-6108 (10th Cir. 2008) (Unpublished)
"It was clearly established, at least two years before the events in question, that absent probable cause and a warrant or exigent circumstances, neither police nor social workers may enter a person's home without a valid consent, even for the purpose of taking a child into custody, much less to conduct a search. It was also established that the warrantless seizure and detention of a person without probable cause or exigent circumstances, as alleged in Turner's petition, is unreasonable."

Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000)
"In cases of alleged child abuse, governmental failure to abide by constitutional constraints may have deleterious long-term consequences for the child and, indeed, for the entire family. Ill-considered and improper governmental action may create significant injury where no problem of any kind previously existed."

Walsh v. Erie County Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 731, (N.D. Ohio 2003)
"Despite the Defendants' exaggerated view of their powers, the Fourth Amendment applies to them, as it does to all other officers and agents of the state whose requests to enter, however benign or well-intentioned, are met by a closed door. . . Any agency that expects to send its employees routinely into private homes has a fundamental obligation to ensure that those employees understand the constitutional limits on their authority."

Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, (4th Cir. 1990)
"Substantive due process does not categorically bar the government from altering parental custody rights." What I find interesting about this case is that it was brought pro se, and that he sued a lot more people than I am.

Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997)
Whismans filed this action against juvenile officers and social workers, claiming they violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights of familial association, denying plaintiffs due process of law. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that plaintiffs' claims were not actionable under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Guess again!

Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, (5th Cir. 2000)
Holding that a "childs right to family integrity is concomitant to that of a parent. No qualified immunity for police officers who removed young child in this section 1983 action.

EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTI​ON AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS

-CITE- 28 USC CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -MISC1- Sec. 1391. Venue generally. 1392. Defendants or property in different districts in same State. [1393. Repealed.] 1394. Banking association's action against Comptroller of Currency. 1395. Fine, penalty or forfeiture. 1396. Internal revenue taxes. 1397. Interpleader. 1398. Interstate Commerce Commission's orders. 1399. Partition action involving United States. 1400. Patents and copyrights, mask works, and designs. 1401. Stockholder's derivative action. 1402. United States as defendant. 1403. Eminent domain. 1404. Change of venue. 1405. Creation or alteration of district or division. 1406. Cure or waiver of defects. 1407. Multidistrict litigation. 1408. Venue of cases under title 11. 1409. Venue of proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11. 1410. Venue of cases ancillary to foreign proceedings. 1411. Jury trials. 1412. Change of venue. 1413. Venue of cases under chapter 5 of title 3. AMENDMENTS 1998 - Pub. L. 105-304, title V, Sec. 503(c)(3), Oct. 28, 1998, 112 Stat. 2917 inserted ", mask works, and designs" in item 1400. 1996 - Pub. L. 104-331, Sec. 3(b)(2)(B), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4069, which directed amendment of table of sections for chapter 37 by adding item 1413 at end, was executed by adding item 1413 at end of table of sections for chapter 87 to reflect the probable intent of Congress. 1988 - Pub. L. 100-702, title X, Sec. 1001(a), Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4664, struck out item 1393 "Divisions; single defendant; defendants in different divisions". 1984 - Pub. L. 98-353, title I, Sec. 102(b), July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 335, added items 1408 to 1412. 1978 - Pub. L. 95-598, title II, Sec. 240(b), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2668, directed the addition of item 1408, "Bankruptcy appeals", which amendment did not become effective pursuant to section 402(b) of Pub. L. 95-598, as amended, set out as an Effective Date note preceding section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 1968 - Pub. L. 90-296, Sec. 2, Apr. 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 110, added item 1407. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1391 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1391. Venue generally -STATUTE- (a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. (b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. (c) For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. In a State which has more than one judicial district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is no such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most significant contacts. (d) An alien may be sued in any district. (e) A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. Additional persons may be joined as parties to any such action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other venue requirements as would be applicable if the United States or one of its officers, employees, or agencies were not a party. The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought. (f) A civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be brought - (1) in any judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; (2) in any judicial district in which the vessel or cargo of a foreign state is situated, if the claim is asserted under section 1605(b) of this title; (3) in any judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do business or is doing business, if the action is brought against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section 1603(b) of this title; or (4) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia if the action is brought against a foreign state or political subdivision thereof. (g) A civil action in which jurisdiction of the district court is based upon section 1369 of this title may be brought in any district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the accident giving rise to the action took place. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 935; Pub. L. 87-748, Sec. 2, Oct. 5, 1962, 76 Stat. 744; Pub. L. 88-234, Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 473; Pub. L. 89-714, Secs. 1, 2, Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1111; Pub. L. 94- 574, Sec. 3, Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2721; Pub. L. 94-583, Sec. 5, Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2897; Pub. L. 100-702, title X, Sec. 1013(a), Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4669; Pub. L. 101-650, title III, Sec. 311, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5114; Pub. L. 102-198, Sec. 3, Dec. 9, 1991, 105 Stat. 1623; Pub. L. 102-572, title V, Sec. 504, Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4513; Pub. L. 104-34, Sec. 1, Oct. 3, 1995, 109 Stat. 293; Pub. L. 107-273, div. C, title I, Sec. 11020(b)(2), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1827.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Secs. 111, 112 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Secs. 50, 51, 36 Stat. 1101; Sept. 19, 1922, ch. 345, 42 Stat. 849; Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 526, Sec. 1, 43 Stat. 1264; Apr. 16, 1936, ch. 230, 49 Stat. 1213). Section consolidates section 111 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with part of section 112 of such title. The portion of section 112 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to venue generally constitutes this section and the parts relating to arrest of the defendant, venue and process in stockholders' actions constitute sections 1401, 1693, and 1695 of this title. Provision in section 111 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., that a district court may proceed as to parties before it although one or more defendants do not reside in the district, and that its judgment shall be without prejudice to such absent defendants, was omitted as covered by rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Word "action" was substituted for "suit" in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Word "reside" was substituted for "whereof he is an inhabitant" for clarity inasmuch as "inhabitant" and "resident" are synonymous. (See Ex parte Shaw, 1892, 12 S.Ct. 935, 145 U.S. 444, 36 L.Ed. 768; Standard Stoker Co., Inc. v. Lower, D.C., 1931, 46 F.2d 678; Edgewater Realty Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., D.C., 1943, 49 F.Supp. 807.) Reference to "all plaintiffs" and "all defendants" were substituted for references to "the plaintiff" and "the defendant," in view of many decisions holding that the singular terms were used in a collective sense. (See Smith v. Lyon, 1890, 10 S.Ct. 303, 133 U.S. 315, 33 L.Ed. 635; Hooe v. Jamieson, 1897, 17 S.Ct. 596, 166 U.S. 395, 41 L.Ed. 1049; and Fetzer v. Livermore, D.C., 1926, 15 F.2d 462.) In subsection (c), references to defendants "found" within a district or voluntarily appearing were omitted. The use of the word "found" made section 111 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., ambiguous. The argument that an action could be brought in the district where one defendant resided and a nonresident defendant was "found," was rejected in Camp v. Gress, 1919, 39 S.Ct. 478, 250 U.S. 308, 63 L.Ed. 997. However, this ambiguity will be obviated in the future by the omission of such reference. Subsection (d) of this section is added to give statutory recognition to the weight of authority concerning a rule of venue as to which there has been a sharp conflict of decisions. (See Sandusky Foundry & Machine Co. v. DeLavand, 1918, D.C.Ohio, 251 F. 631, 632, and cases cited. See also Keating v. Pennsylvania Co., 1917, D.C.Ohio, 245 F. 155 and cases cited.) Changes were made in phraseology. -REFTEXT- REFERENCES IN TEXT The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (e), are set out in the Appendix to this title. -MISC2- AMENDMENTS 2002 - Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 107-273 added subsec. (g). 1995 - Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 104-34 substituted "any defendant is" for "the defendants are". 1992 - Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 102-572 inserted before period at end ", if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought". 1991 - Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 102-198 substituted "in (1)" for "if (1)". 1990 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 101-650, Sec. 311(1), substituted cls. (1) to (3) for "the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose". Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101-650, Sec. 311(2), substituted "may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only if" and cls. (1) to (3) for "may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law". Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101-650, Sec. 311(3), substituted "(2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3)" for "or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4)". 1988 - Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 100-702 amended subsec. (c) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (c) read as follows: "A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes." 1976 - Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 94-574 provided that, in actions against the United States, its agencies, or officers or employees in their official capacities, additional persons may be joined in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with other venue requirements which would be applicable if the United States, its agencies, or one of its officers or employees were not a party. Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 94-583 added subsec. (f). 1966 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 89-714, Sec. 1, authorized a civil action to be brought in the judicial district in which the claim arose. Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 89-714, Sec. 1, authorized a civil action to be brought in the judicial district in which the claim arose. Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 89-714, Sec. 2, repealed subsec. (f) which permitted a civil action on a tort claim arising out of the manufacture, assembly, repair, ownership, maintenance, use, or operation of an automobile to be brought in the judicial district wherein the act or omission complained of occurred. Present provisions are now contained in subsecs. (a) and (b) of this section. 1963 - Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 88-234 added subsec. (f) 1962 - Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 87-748 added subsec. (e). EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2002 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 107-273 applicable to a civil action if the accident giving rise to the cause of action occurred on or after the 90th day after Nov. 2, 2002, see section 11020(c) of Pub. L. 107-273, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1369 of this title. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 102-572 effective Jan. 1, 1993, see section 1101(a) of Pub. L. 102-572, set out as a note under section 905 of Title 2, The Congress. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1988 AMENDMENT Section 1013(b) of title X of Pub. L. 100-702 provided that: "The amendment made by this section [amending this section] takes effect 90 days after the date of enactment of this title [Nov. 19, 1988]." EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1976 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 94-583 effective 90 days after Oct. 21, 1976, see section 8 of Pub. L. 94-583, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1602 of this title. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1392 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1392. Defendants or property in different districts in same State -STATUTE- Any civil action, of a local nature, involving property located in different districts in the same State, may be brought in any of such districts. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 935; Pub. L. 104-220, Sec. 1, Oct. 1, 1996, 110 Stat. 3023.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Secs. 113, 116 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Secs. 52, 55, 36 Stat. 1101, 1102). Section consolidates section 113 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with section 116 of such title. Last sentence of section 113 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to execution on judgments or decrees, was omitted as covered by section 2001 et seq. of this title. Words "civil action" were substituted for "suit" in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Words of said section 113, "against a single defendant, inhabitant of such State, must be brought in the district where he resides" were omitted as covered by section 1391 of this title. Words of section 116 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., "land or other subject matter of a fixed character" were deleted and the word "property" substituted for flexibility and uniformity. (See sections 754, 1692, of this title and reviser's notes thereunder.) Words of said section 116, "and the court in which it is brought shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide it, and to cause mesne or final process to be issued and executed, as fully as if the said subject matter were wholly within the district for which such court is constituted" were omitted as surplusage and fully covered by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Said rule also covers the following omitted language: "A duplicate writ may be issued against the defendants, directed to the marshal of any other district in which any defendant resides." Changes were made in phraseology. AMENDMENTS 1996 - Pub. L. 104-220 struck out "(b)" before "Any civil action" and struck out subsec. (a) which read as follows: "Any civil action, not of a local nature, against defendants residing in different districts in the same State, may be brought in any of such districts." -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1393 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1393. Repealed. -MISC1- [Sec. 1393. Repealed. Pub. L. 100-702, title X, Sec. 1001(a), Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4664]. Section, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 935, related to divisional venue in civil cases of a single defendant or defendants in different divisions. EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPEAL Section 1001(b) of Pub. L. 100-702 provided that: "The amendments made by this section [repealing this section] take effect 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act [Nov. 19, 1988]." -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1394 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1394. Banking association's action against Comptroller of Currency -STATUTE- Any civil action by a national banking association to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, under the provisions of any Act of Congress relating to such associations, may be prosecuted in the judicial district where such association is located. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 935.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 110 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 49, 36 Stat. 1100). Words "Any civil action" were substituted for "All proceedings," in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Changes were made in phraseology. -TRANS- EXCEPTION AS TO TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS Functions vested by any provision of law in the Comptroller of the Currency, referred to in this section, were not included in the transfer of functions of officers, agencies and employees of the Department of the Treasury to the Secretary of the Treasury, made by Reorg. Plan No. 26 of 1950, Sec. 1, eff. July 31, 1950, 15 F.R. 4935, 64 Stat. 1280. See section 321(c)(2) of Title 31, Money and Finance. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1395 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1395. Fine, penalty or forfeiture -STATUTE- (a) A civil proceeding for the recovery of a pecuniary fine, penalty or forfeiture may be prosecuted in the district where it accrues or the defendant is found. (b) A civil proceeding for the forfeiture of property may be prosecuted in any district where such property is found. (c) A civil proceeding for the forfeiture of property seized outside any judicial district may be prosecuted in any district into which the property is brought. (d) A proceeding in admiralty for the enforcement of fines, penalties and forfeitures against a vessel may be brought in any district in which the vessel is arrested. (e) Any proceeding for the forfeiture of a vessel or cargo entering a port of entry closed by the President in pursuance of law, or of goods and chattels coming from a State or section declared by proclamation of the President to be in insurrection, or of any vessel or vehicle conveying persons or property to or from such State or section or belonging in whole or in part to a resident thereof, may be prosecuted in any district into which the property is taken and in which the proceeding is instituted. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 936.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Secs. 104, 106, 107, and 108, and section 3745(c) of title 26, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Internal Revenue Code (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Secs. 43, 45, 46, 47, 36 Stat. 1100; Feb. 10, 1939, ch. 2, Sec. 3745(c), 53 Stat. 460). This section consolidates section 3745(c) of title 26, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with sections 104, 106, 107, and 108 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to venue in civil proceedings to recover and enforce civil fines, penalties, and forfeitures, pecuniary or otherwise. Subsection (a) is based on said section 104 of title 28 and said section 3745(c) of title 26. Subsections (b) and (c) consolidate such sections 106 and 107 of title 28. Subsection (e) is based on such section 108 of title 28. Subsection (b) substituted words "may be prosecuted in any district where such property is found" for "shall be prosecuted in the district where the seizure is made," to include not only property seized, but also all other property subject to forfeiture. Words "civil" and "fine" were inserted to make this section applicable to the many provisions of the United States Code for fines essentially civil. (See reviser's note under section 1355 of this title.) Provisions of section 3745(c) of title 26, U.S.C., 1940 ed., that such suit may be brought "before any other court of competent jurisdiction" were omitted as misleading surplusage, since United States district courts, under section 1355 of this title, have exclusive jurisdiction. Subsection (d) was added for completeness and clarity. Changes were made in phraseology. SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT While section 3745(c) of Title 26, U.S.C., Internal Revenue Code, is one of the sources of this section, it was eliminated from the schedule of repeals by Senate amendment. Therefore, such section 3745(c) remains in Title 26. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1396 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1396. Internal revenue taxes -STATUTE- Any civil action for the collection of internal revenue taxes may be brought in the district where the liability for such tax accrues, in the district of the taxpayer's residence, or in the district where the return was filed. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 936.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 105, and section 3744 of title 26, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Internal Revenue Code (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 44, 36 Stat. 1100; Feb. 10, 1939, ch. 2, Sec. 3744, 53 Stat. 460). Section consolidates section 3744 of title 26, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Internal Revenue Code, with section 105 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. Words "or in the district where the return was filed" are new. This extension of venue will permit of an action in a district easily determinable for collection of revenue earned in several districts, or States, but the return for which is filed with one collector. Changes were made in phraseology. SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT While section 3744 of Title 26, U.S.C., Internal Revenue Code [1939], is one of the sources of this section, it was eliminated from the schedule of repeals by Senate amendment. Therefore, it remains in Title 26 [I.R.C. 1939]. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1397 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1397. Interpleader -STATUTE- Any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this title may be brought in the judicial district in which one or more of the claimants reside. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 936.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 41(26) (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 24, par. 26, as added Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, Sec. 1, 49 Stat. 1096). Provisions of section 41(26) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to jurisdiction are the basis of section 1335 of this title and other provisions thereof are incorporated in section 2361 of this title. Words "civil action" were substituted for "suit," in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Changes were made in phraseology. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1398 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1398. Interstate Commerce Commission's orders -STATUTE- (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action brought under section 1336(a) of this title shall be brought only in a judicial district in which any of the parties bringing the action resides or has its principal office. (b) A civil action to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend, in whole or in part, an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission made pursuant to the referral of a question or issue by a district court or by the United States Court of Federal Claims, shall be brought only in the court which referred the question or issue. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 936; Pub. L. 88-513, Sec. 2, Aug. 30, 1964, 78 Stat. 695; Pub. L. 93-584, Sec. 2, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1917; Pub. L. 97-164, title I, Sec. 130, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 39; Pub. L. 102-572, title IX, Sec. 902(b)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 43 (Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 219). This section is completely rewritten to give effect to changes recommended by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Section 43 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., is as follows: "Sec. 43. Venue of suits relating to orders of Interstate Commerce Commission. "The venue of any suit brought to enforce, suspend, or set aside, in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be in the judicial district wherein is the residence of the party or any of the parties upon whose petition the order was made, except that where the order does not relate to transportation or is not made upon the petition of any party the venue shall be in the district where the matter complained of in the petition before the commission arises, and except that where the order does not relate either to transportation or to a matter so complained of before the commission the matter covered by the order shall be deemed to arise in the district where one of the petitioners in court has either its principal office or its principal operating office. In case such transportation relates to a through shipment the term 'destination' shall be construed as meaning final destination of such shipment." The amendment of section 207 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., proposed by the Judicial Conference is: "Except as otherwise provided in the Act entitled 'An Act to Regulate Commerce', approved February 4, 1887, as amended, the venue of any suit brought to enforce, suspend, or set aside, in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be in the judicial district wherein is the residence of the party or any of the parties bringing the suit or wherein such party or any of such parties has its principal office." The revised section substitutes the words "Except as otherwise provided by law" for the words of the conference bill, "in the act entitled 'An Act to Regulate Commerce, approved February 4, 1887, as amended' ". (See section 16 of title 49, U.S.C., 1940 ed., which provides for jurisdiction and venue of actions to enforce Interstate Commerce Commission orders for the payment of money.) AMENDMENTS 1992 - Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 102-572 substituted "United States Court of Federal Claims" for "United States Claims Court". 1982 - Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 97-164 substituted "United States Claims Court" for "Court of Claims". 1975 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 93-584 substituted provisions that civil actions under section 1336(a) of this title shall be brought only in a judicial district in which any of the parties bringing the action resides or has its principal office, for provisions that civil actions to enforce, suspend, or set aside in whole or in part orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be brought in such judicial district. 1964 - Pub. L. 88-513 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b). EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 102-572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102-572, set out as a note under section 171 of this title. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 97-164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97-164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1975 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 93-584 not applicable to actions commenced on or before last day of first month beginning after Jan. 2, 1975, and actions to enjoin or suspend orders of Interstate Commerce Commission which are pending when this amendment becomes effective shall not be affected thereby, but shall proceed to final disposition under the law existing on the date they were commenced, see section 10 of Pub. L. 93-584, set out as a note under section 2321 of this title. -TRANS- ABOLITION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS Interstate Commerce Commission abolished and functions of Commission transferred, except as otherwise provided in Pub. L. 104- 88, to Surface Transportation Board effective Jan. 1, 1996, by section 702 of Title 49, Transportation, and section 101 of Pub. L. 104-88, set out as a note under section 701 of Title 49. References to Interstate Commerce Commission deemed to refer to Surface Transportation Board, a member or employee of the Board, or Secretary of Transportation, as appropriate, see section 205 of Pub. L. 104-88, set out as a note under section 701 of Title 49. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1399 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1399. Partition action involving United States -STATUTE- Any civil action by any tenant in common or joint tenant for the partition of lands, where the United States is one of the tenants in common or joint tenants, may be brought only in the judicial district where such lands are located or, if located in different districts in the same State, in any of such districts. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 936.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 41(25) (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 24, par. 25, 36 Stat. 1094). Provisions of section 41(25) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to jurisdiction are the basis of section 1347 of this title. Words "civil action" were substituted for "suits in equity," in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Provision with respect to property in different districts was added to conform with section 1392 of this title. Changes were made in phraseology. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1400 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1400. Patents and copyrights, mask works, and designs -STATUTE- (a) Civil actions, suits, or proceedings arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights or exclusive rights in mask works or designs may be instituted in the district in which the defendant or his agent resides or may be found. (b) Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 936; Pub. L. 100-702, title X, Sec. 1020(a)(5), Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4671; Pub. L. 105-304, title V, Sec. 503(c)(1), (2), Oct. 28, 1998, 112 Stat. 2917; Pub. L. 106-44, Sec. 2(a), Aug. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 223.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 109, and section 35 of title 17, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Copyrights (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, Sec. 35, 35 Stat. 1084; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 48, 36 Stat. 1100). Section consolidates section 35 of title 17, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with part of section 109 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with necessary changes in phraseology. Subsection (b) is based on section 109 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with the following changes: Words "civil action" were substituted for "suit," and words "in law or in equity," after "shall have jurisdiction" were deleted, in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Words in subsection (b) "where the defendant resides" were substituted for "of which the defendant is an inhabitant." A corresponding change was made in subsection (a). Words "inhabitant" and "resident," as respects venue, are synonymous. (See reviser's note under section 1391 of this title.) Words "whether a person, partnership, or corporation" before "has committed" were omitted as surplusage. The provisions of section 109 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to process are incorporated in section 1694 of this title. Jurisdiction and venue of patent suits against residents of foreign countries or persons residing in plurality of districts, see section 72a of title 35, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Patents. SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT Title 17 of the United States Code was enacted into positive law by act July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652, and, in such enactment, section 35 of the prior title became section 111 of the new title, and all Acts from which sections of the prior title had been derived, were repealed. Therefore, this paragraph should read: "Based on Title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 109 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 48, 36 Stat. 1100), and section 111 of Title 17, U.S.C., 1946 ed., Copyrights." By Senate amendment, section 111 of Title 17 U.S.C., is included in the schedule of repeals. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559. AMENDMENTS 1999 - Pub. L. 106-44 amended section catchline generally so as to read "Patents and copyrights, mask works, and designs". 1998 - Pub. L. 105-304, Sec. 503(c)(2), amended section catchline generally, substituting "Patents and copyrights, mask works, and designs" for "Patents and copyrights". Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 105-304, Sec. 503(c)(1), inserted "or designs" after "mask works". 1988 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 100-702 inserted "or exclusive rights in mask works" after "copyrights". -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1401 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1401. Stockholder's derivative action -STATUTE- Any civil action by a stockholder on behalf of his corporation may be prosecuted in any judicial district where the corporation might have sued the same defendants. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 936.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 112 (part) (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 51, 36 Stat. 1101; Sept. 19, 1922, ch. 345, 42 Stat. 849; Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 526, Sec. 1, 43 Stat. 1264; Apr. 16, 1936, ch. 230, 49 Stat. 1213). For disposition of other provisions of section 112 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., see reviser's note under section 1391 of this title. Words "civil action" were substituted for "suit," in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Words "other than said corporation," after "same defendants," were omitted as superfluous. Obviously a corporation would not be suing itself. Changes were made in phraseology. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1402 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1402. United States as defendant -STATUTE- (a) Any civil action in a district court against the United States under subsection (a) of section 1346 of this title may be prosecuted only: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides; (2) In the case of a civil action by a corporation under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of section 1346, in the judicial district in which is located the principal place of business or principal office or agency of the corporation; or if it has no principal place of business or principal office or agency in any judicial district (A) in the judicial district in which is located the office to which was made the return of the tax in respect of which the claim is made, or (B) if no return was made, in the judicial district in which lies the District of Columbia. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this paragraph a district court, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, may transfer any such action to any other district or division. (b) Any civil action on a tort claim against the United States under subsection (b) of section 1346 of this title may be prosecuted only in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred. (c) Any civil action against the United States under subsection (e) of section 1346 of this title may be prosecuted only in the judicial district where the property is situated at the time of levy, or if no levy is made, in the judicial district in which the event occurred which gave rise to the cause of action. (d) Any civil action under section 2409a to quiet title to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed by the United States shall be brought in the district court of the district where the property is located or, if located in different districts, in any of such districts. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 937; Pub. L. 85-920, Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1770; Pub. L. 89-719, title II, Sec. 202(b), Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1149; Pub. L. 92-562, Sec. 2, Oct. 25, 1972, 86 Stat. 1176; Pub. L. 97-164, title I, Sec. 131, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 39.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Secs. 762, 931(a) (Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, Sec. 5, 24 Stat. 506; Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, Sec. 410(a), 60 Stat. 843). Section consolidates the venue provisions of section 762 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with the venue provisions of section 931(a) of such title, the latter provisions relating to tort claims cases. The jurisdictional provisions of such section 931(a) are incorporated in section 1346(b) of this title. For other provisions thereof, see Distribution Table. Provisions of section 762 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to the verification and contents of a petition filed against the United States were omitted as unnecessary. Section 265 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relative to the petition in cases filed in the Court of Claims was also omitted from the revised title. (See, also, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.) Words "civil action" were substituted for "suit" in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Changes were made in phraseology. AMENDMENTS 1982 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97-164 inserted "in a district court" after "civil action" in introductory provisions preceding par. (1). The phrase "civil action" also appeared in par. (2), but no change was made to reflect the probable intent of Congress as indicated on page 79 of House Report No. 97-312. 1972 - Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 92-562 added subsec. (d). 1966 - Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 89-719 added subsec. (c). 1958 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 85-920 provided for venue and change of venue in tax refund suits by corporation. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 97-164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97-164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 89-719 applicable after Nov. 2, 1966, see section 203 of Pub. L. 89-719, set out as a note under section 1346 of this title. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1403 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1403. Eminent domain -STATUTE- Proceedings to condemn real estate for the use of the United States or its departments or agencies shall be brought in the district court of the district where the land is located or, if located in different districts in the same State, in any of such districts. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 937.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on section 257 of title 40, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Public Buildings, Property, and Works (Aug. 1, 1888, ch. 728, Sec. 1, 25 Stat. 357; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 291, 36 Stat. 1167). Section constitutes the first clause of the second sentence of section 257, of title 40, U.S.C., 1940 ed. The revised section is expressive of the purpose of such section 257 with necessary changes in phraseology. The jurisdiction provision of section 257 of title 40, U.S.C., 1940 ed., is incorporated in section 1358 of this title. The remainder of section 257 of title 40, U.S.C., 1940 ed., is retained in said title 40. Provision with respect to property in different districts was added to conform with section 1392 of this title. See, also, section 1392 of this title which fixes venue of an action involving property in different districts in the same State. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1404 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1404. Change of venue -STATUTE- (a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought. (b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the discretion of the court, from the division in which pending to any other division in the same district. Transfer of proceedings in rem brought by or on behalf of the United States may be transferred under this section without the consent of the United States where all other parties request transfer. (c) A district court may order any civil action to be tried at any place within the division in which it is pending. (d) As used in this section, the term "district court" includes the District Court of Guam, the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the term "district" includes the territorial jurisdiction of each such court. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 937; Pub. L. 87-845, Sec. 9, Oct. 18, 1962, 76A Stat. 699; Pub. L. 104-317, title VI, Sec. 610(a), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3860.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Secs. 119, 163 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 58, 36 Stat. 1103; Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 475, Sec. 5, 39 Stat. 851). Section consolidates sections 119 and 163 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with necessary changes in phraseology and substance. Section 119 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., related only to transfer of cases from one division to another on stipulation of the parties. Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is proper. As an example of the need of such a provision, see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 1941, 62 S.Ct. 6, 314 U.S. 44, 86 L.Ed. 28, which was prosecuted under the Federal Employer's Liability Act in New York, although the accident occurred and the employee resided in Ohio. The new subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice to do so. Sections 143, 172, 177, and 181 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to the district courts of Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, and Ohio, contained special provisions similar to subsection (b), applicable to those States. To establish uniformity, the general language of such subsection has been drafted and the special provisions of those sections omitted. Subsection (b) is based upon section 163 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., which applied only to the district of Maine. This revised subsection extends to all judicial districts and permits transfer of cases between divisions. Criminal cases may be transferred pursuant to Rules 19-21 of the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the criminal provisions of said section 163 are therefore omitted. AMENDMENTS 1996 - Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 104-317 amended subsec. (d) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (d) read as follows: "As used in this section, 'district court' includes the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone; and 'district' includes the territorial jurisdiction of that court." 1962 - Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 87-845 added subsec. (d). EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1996 AMENDMENT Section 610(c) of Pub. L. 104-317 provided that: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section and section 1406 of this title] apply to cases pending on the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 19, 1996] and to cases commenced on or after such date." EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1962 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 87-845 effective Jan. 2, 1963, see section 25 of Pub. L. 87-845, set out as a note under section 414 of this title. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1405 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1405. Creation or alteration of district or division -STATUTE- Actions or proceedings pending at the time of the creation of a new district or division or transfer of a county or territory from one division or district to another may be tried in the district or division as it existed at the institution of the action or proceeding, or in the district or division so created or to which the county or territory is so transferred as the parties shall agree or the court direct. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 937.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 121 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 59, 36 Stat. 1103). Enforcement of liens in like circumstances is provided by section 1656 of this title. Remainder of section 121 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., is incorporated in section 3240 of revised title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure (H.R. 1600, 80th Cong.). Changes were made in phraseology. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1406 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1406. Cure or waiver of defects -STATUTE- (a) The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought. (b) Nothing in this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court of any matter involving a party who does not interpose timely and sufficient objection to the venue. (c) As used in this section, the term "district court" includes the District Court of Guam, the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the term "district" includes the territorial jurisdiction of each such court. -SOURCE- (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 937; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, Sec. 81, 63 Stat. 101; Pub. L. 86-770, Sec. 1, Sept. 13, 1960, 74 Stat. 912; Pub. L. 87-845, Sec. 10, Oct. 18, 1962, 76A Stat. 699; Pub. L. 97-164, title I, Sec. 132, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 39; Pub. L. 104- 317, title VI, Sec. 610(b), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3860.) -MISC1- HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES 1948 ACT Subsection (a) provides statutory sanction for transfer instead of dismissal, where venue is improperly laid. Subsection (b) is declaratory of existing law. (See Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 1924, 44 S.Ct. 391, 264 U.S. 375, 68 L.Ed. 748.) It makes clear the intent of Congress that venue provisions are not jurisdictional but may be waived. 1949 ACT This section removes an ambiguity in section 1406(a) of title 28, U.S.C., by substituting "may" for "shall", thus making it clear that the court may decline to transfer a case brought in the wrong district under circumstances where it would not be in the interest of justice to make such transfer. [The amendment to section 1406(a) of this title described in this note was altered in the bill as enacted. See Cong. Rec., vol. 95, pt. 5, pp. 5826, 5827, 6283, 6284.] AMENDMENTS 1996 - Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 104-317 amended subsec. (c) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (c) read as follows: "As used in this section, 'district court' includes the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone; and 'district' includes the territorial jurisdiction of that court." 1982 - Subsecs. (c), (d). Pub. L. 97-164 redesignated subsec. (d) as (c). Former subsec. (c), which provided that if a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims were filed in a district court, the district court, if it were in the interest of justice, was required to transfer the case to the Court of Claims where the case would proceed as if it had been filed in the Court of Claims on the date that it was filed in the district court, was struck out. 1962 - Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 87-845 added subsec. (d). 1960 - Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 86-770 added subsec. (c). 1949 - Subsec. (a). Act May 24, 1949, inserted "dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice". EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1996 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 104-317 applicable to cases pending on Oct. 19, 1996, and to cases commenced on or after such date, see section 610(c) of Pub. L. 104-317, set out as a note under section 1404 of this title. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 97-164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97-164, set out as a note under section 171 of this title. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1962 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 87-845 effective Jan. 2, 1962, see section 25 of Pub. L. 87-845, set out as a note under section 414 of this title. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1960 AMENDMENT Section 4 of Pub. L. 86-770 provided in part that: "The amendments made by sections 1 and 2 of this Act [adding subsec. (c) of this section and section 1506 of this title] shall apply to any case or proceeding pending on, or brought after, the date of enactment of this Act [Sept. 13, 1960] in the district courts or the Court of Claims." -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1407 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1407. Multidistrict litigation -STATUTE- (a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded. (b) Such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall be conducted by a judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation. For this purpose, upon request of the panel, a circuit judge or a district judge may be designated and assigned temporarily for service in the transferee district by the Chief Justice of the United States or the chief judge of the circuit, as may be required, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 13 of this title. With the consent of the transferee district court, such actions may be assigned by the panel to a judge or judges of such district. The judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned, the members of the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation, and other circuit and district judges designated when needed by the panel may exercise the powers of a district judge in any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. (c) Proceedings for the transfer of an action under this section may be initiated by - (i) the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation upon its own initiative, or (ii) motion filed with the panel by a party in any action in which transfer for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings under this section may be appropriate. A copy of such motion shall be filed in the district court in which the moving party's action is pending. The panel shall give notice to the parties in all actions in which transfers for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings are contemplated, and such notice shall specify the time and place of any hearing to determine whether such transfer shall be made. Orders of the panel to set a hearing and other orders of the panel issued prior to the order either directing or denying transfer shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court in which a transfer hearing is to be or has been held. The panel's order of transfer shall be based upon a record of such hearing at which material evidence may be offered by any party to an action pending in any district that would be affected by the proceedings under this section, and shall be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon such record. Orders of transfer and such other orders as the panel may make thereafter shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the transferee district and shall be effective when thus filed. The clerk of the transferee district court shall forthwith transmit a certified copy of the panel's order to transfer to the clerk of the district court from which the action is being transferred. An order denying transfer shall be filed in each district wherein there is a case pending in which the motion for transfer has been made. (d) The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of seven circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice of the United States, no two of whom shall be from the same circuit. The concurrence of four members shall be necessary to any action by the panel. (e) No proceedings for review of any order of the panel may be permitted except by extraordinary writ pursuant to the provisions of title 28, section 1651, United States Code. Petitions for an extraordinary writ to review an order of the panel to set a transfer hearing and other orders of the panel issued prior to the order either directing or denying transfer shall be filed only in the court of appeals having jurisdiction over the district in which a hearing is to be or has been held. Petitions for an extraordinary writ to review an order to transfer or orders subsequent to transfer shall be filed only in the court of appeals having jurisdiction over the transferee district. There shall be no appeal or review of an order of the panel denying a motion to transfer for consolidated or coordinated proceedings. (f) The panel may prescribe rules for the conduct of its business not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (g) Nothing in this section shall apply to any action in which the United States is a complainant arising under the antitrust laws. "Antitrust laws" as used herein include those acts referred to in the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended (38 Stat. 730; 15 U.S.C. 12), and also include the Act of June 19, 1936 (49 Stat. 1526; 15 U.S.C. 13, 13a, and 13b) and the Act of September 26, 1914, as added March 21, 1938 (52 Stat. 116, 117; 15 U.S.C. 56); but shall not include section 4A of the Act of October 15, 1914, as added July 7, 1955 (69 Stat. 282; 15 U.S.C. 15a). (h) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1404 or subsection (f) of this section, the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation may consolidate and transfer with or without the consent of the parties, for both pretrial purposes and for trial, any action brought under section 4C of the Clayton Act. -SOURCE- (Added Pub. L. 90-296, Sec. 1, Apr. 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 109; amended Pub. L. 94-435, title III, Sec. 303, Sept. 30, 1976, 90 Stat. 1396.) -REFTEXT- REFERENCES IN TEXT The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (f), are set out in the Appendix to this title. Section 4C of the Clayton Act, referred to in subsec. (h), is section 4C of act Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, as added by Pub. L. 94- 435, title III, Sec. 301, Sept. 30, 1976, 90 Stat. 1394, which is classified to section 15c of Title 15, Commerce and Trade. -MISC1- AMENDMENTS 1976 - Pub. L. 94-435 added subsec. (h). -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1408 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1408. Venue of cases under title 11 -STATUTE- Except as provided in section 1410 of this title, a case under title 11 may be commenced in the district court for the district - (1) in which the domicile, residence, principal place of business in the United States, or principal assets in the United States, of the person or entity that is the subject of such case have been located for the one hundred and eighty days immediately preceding such commencement, or for a longer portion of such one- hundred-and-eighty-day period than the domicile, residence, or principal place of business, in the United States, or principal assets in the United States, of such person were located in any other district; or (2) in which there is pending a case under title 11 concerning such person's affiliate, general partner, or partnership. -SOURCE- (Added Pub. L. 98-353, title I, Sec. 102(a), July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 334.) -MISC1- PRIOR PROVISIONS A prior section 1408, added by Pub. L. 95-598, title II, Sec. 240(a), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2668, which related to bankruptcy appeals, did not become effective pursuant to section 402(b) of Pub. L. 95-598, as amended, set out as an Effective Date note preceding section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. EFFECTIVE DATE Section effective July 10, 1984, see section 122(a) of Pub. L. 98- 353, set out as a note under section 151 of this title. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1409 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1409. Venue of proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11 -STATUTE- (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (d), a proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 may be commenced in the district court in which such case is pending. (b) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, a trustee in a case under title 11 may commence a proceeding arising in or related to such case to recover a money judgment of or property worth less than $1,000 or a consumer debt of less than $15,000, or a debt (excluding a consumer debt) against a noninsider of less than $10,000, only in the district court for the district in which the defendant resides. (c) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a trustee in a case under title 11 may commence a proceeding arising in or related to such case as statutory successor to the debtor or creditors under section 541 or 544(b) of title 11 in the district court for the district where the State or Federal court sits in which, under applicable nonbankruptcy venue provisions, the debtor or creditors, as the case may be, may have commenced an action on which such proceeding is based if the case under title 11 had not been commenced. (d) A trustee may commence a proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 based on a claim arising after the commencement of such case from the operation of the business of the debtor only in the district court for the district where a State or Federal court sits in which, under applicable nonbankruptcy venue provisions, an action on such claim may have been brought. (e) A proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11, based on a claim arising after the commencement of such case from the operation of the business of the debtor, may be commenced against the representative of the estate in such case in the district court for the district where the State or Federal court sits in which the party commencing such proceeding may, under applicable nonbankruptcy venue provisions, have brought an action on such claim, or in the district court in which such case is pending. -SOURCE- (Added Pub. L. 98-353, title I, Sec. 102(a), July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 334; amended Pub. L. 109-8, title IV, Sec. 410, Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 106.) -MISC1- AMENDMENTS 2005 - Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 109-8 substituted "$15,000, or a debt (excluding a consumer debt) against a noninsider of less than $10,000," for "$5,000". EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2005 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 109-8 effective 180 days after Apr. 20, 2005, and not applicable with respect to cases commenced under Title 11, Bankruptcy, before such effective date, except as otherwise provided, see section 1501 of Pub. L. 109-8, set out as a note under section 101 of Title 11. EFFECTIVE DATE Section effective July 10, 1984, see section 122(a) of Pub. L. 98- 353, set out as a note under section 151 of this title. ADJUSTMENT OF DOLLAR AMOUNTS For adjustment of dollar amounts specified in subsec. (b) of this section by the Judicial Conference of the United States, see note set out under section 104 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1410 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1410. Venue of cases ancillary to foreign proceedings -STATUTE- A case under chapter 15 of title 11 may be commenced in the district court of the United States for the district - (1) in which the debtor has its principal place of business or principal assets in the United States; (2) if the debtor does not have a place of business or assets in the United States, in which there is pending against the debtor an action or proceeding in a Federal or State court; or (3) in a case other than those specified in paragraph (1) or (2), in which venue will be consistent with the interests of justice and the convenience of the parties, having regard to the relief sought by the foreign representative. -SOURCE- (Added Pub. L. 98-353, title I, Sec. 102(a), July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 335; amended Pub. L. 109-8, title VIII, Sec. 802(c)(4), Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 146.) -MISC1- AMENDMENTS 2005 - Pub. L. 109-8 amended section generally. Prior to amendment, section related to venue of cases commenced under section 304 of title 11. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2005 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 109-8 effective 180 days after Apr. 20, 2005, and not applicable with respect to cases commenced under Title 11, Bankruptcy, before such effective date, except as otherwise provided, see section 1501 of Pub. L. 109-8, set out as a note under section 101 of Title 11. EFFECTIVE DATE Section effective July 10, 1984, see section 122(a) of Pub. L. 98- 353, set out as a note under section 151 of this title. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1411 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1411. Jury trials -STATUTE- (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter and title 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury that an individual has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim. (b) The district court may order the issues arising under section 303 of title 11 to be tried without a jury. -SOURCE- (Added Pub. L. 98-353, title I, Sec. 102(a), July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 335.) -MISC1- EFFECTIVE DATE Section effective July 10, 1984, except that subsec. (a) not applicable with respect to cases under Title 11, Bankruptcy, that are pending on July 10, 1984, or to proceedings arising in or related to such cases, see section 122(a), (b) of Pub. L. 98-353, set out as a note under section 151 of this title. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1412 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1412. Change of venue -STATUTE- A district court may transfer a case or proceeding under title 11 to a district court for another district, in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties. -SOURCE- (Added Pub. L. 98-353, title I, Sec. 102(a), July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 335.) -MISC1- EFFECTIVE DATE Section effective July 10, 1984, see section 122(a) of Pub. L. 98- 353, set out as a note under section 151 of this title. -End- -CITE- 28 USC Sec. 1413 02/01/2010 -EXPCITE- TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE CHAPTER 87 - DISTRICT COURTS; VENUE -HEAD- Sec. 1413. Venue of cases under chapter 5 of title 3 -STATUTE- Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this chapter, a civil action under section 1346(g) may be brought in the United States district court for the district in which the employee is employed or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. -SOURCE- (Added Pub. L. 104-331, Sec. 3(b)(2)(A), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4069.) -COD- CODIFICATION Pub. L. 104-331, Sec. 3(b)(2)(A), which directed the amendment of chapter 37 of this title by adding this section at end, was executed by adding this section at the end of chapter 87 of this title to reflect the probable intent of Congress. -MISC1- EFFECTIVE DATE Section effective Oct. 1, 1997, see section 3(d) of Pub. L. 104- 331, set out as a note under section 1296 of this title. -End-

§3283. Offenses against children

§3283. Offenses against children
No statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child, or for ten years after the offense, whichever is longer.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 828; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, §330018(a), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2149; Pub. L. 108–21, title II, §202, Apr. 30, 2003, 117 Stat. 660; Pub. L. 109–162, title XI, §1182(c), Jan. 5, 2006, 119 Stat. 3126.)

Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §584 (R.S. §1046; July 5, 1884, ch. 225, §2, 23 Stat. 122).

Words “customs laws” were substituted for “revenue laws,” since different limitations are provided for internal revenue violations by section 3748 of title 26, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Internal Revenue Code.

This section was held to apply to offenses under the customs laws. Those offenses are within the term “revenue laws” but not within the term “internal revenue laws”. United States v. Hirsch (1879, 100 U.S. 33, 25 L. Ed. 539), United States v. Shorey (1869, Fed. Cas. No. 16,282), and United States v. Platt (1840, Fed. Cas. No. 16,054a) applied this section in customs cases. Hence it appears that there was no proper basis for the complete elimination from section 584 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., of the reference to revenue laws.

Meaning of “revenue laws”. United States v. Norton (1876, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454), quoting Webster that “revenue” refers to “The income of a nation, derived from its taxes, duties, or other sources, for the payment of the national expenses.” Quoting United States v. Mayo (1813, Fed. Cas. No. 15,755) that “revenue laws” meant such laws “as are made for the direct and avowed purpose of creating revenue or public funds for the service of the Government.”

Definition of revenue. “Revenue” is the income of a State, and the revenue of the Post Office Department, being raised by a tax on mailable matter conveyed in the mail, and which is disbursed in the public service, is as much a part of the income of the government as moneys collected for duties on imports (United States v. Bromley, 53 U.S. 88, 99, 13 L. Ed. 905).

“Revenue” is the product or fruit of taxation. It matters not in what form the power of taxation may be exercised or to what subjects it may be applied, its exercise is intended to provide means for the support of the Government, and the means provided are necessarily to be regarded as the internal revenue. Duties upon imports are imposed for the same general object and, because they are so imposed, the money thus produced is considered revenue, not because it is derived from any particular source (United States v. Wright, 1870, Fed. Cas. No. 16,770).

“Revenue law” is defined as a law for direct object of imposing and collecting taxes, dues, imports, and excises for government and its purposes (In re Mendenhall, D.C. Mont. 1935, 10 F. Supp. 122).

Act Cong. March 2, 1799, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 627, regulating the collection of duties on imports, is a revenue law, within the meaning of act Cong. April 18, 1818, ch. 70, 3 Stat. 433, providing for the mode of suing for and recovering penalties and forfeitures for violations of the revenue laws of the United States (The Abigail, 1824, Fed. Cas. No. 18).

Changes were made in phraseology.

Amendments
2006—Pub. L. 109–162 inserted “, or for ten years after the offense, whichever is longer” after “of the child”.

2003—Pub. L. 108–21 substituted “Offenses against children” for “Child abuse offenses” in section catchline and amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: “No statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution before the child reaches the age of 25 years.”

1994—Pub. L. 103–322 substituted “Child abuse offenses” for “Customs and slave trade violations” as section catchline and amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: “No person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for any violation of the customs laws or the slave trade laws of the United States unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after the commission of the offense.”

Administra​tive Hearing

All government agencies: EMPLOYEES: have private man/woman liable ability as the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,dba,CORPORATION exists in name only thanks to the Bankruptcy Act of 1933: NOT KNOWN TO MOST AND IMPROPERLY TRAINED FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.

Bureau of State Hearings
P.O. Box 182825
Columbus, Ohio 42272



All agencies, departments and offices were handed over to the receivers of the Bankruptcy and they gave us a new government:

Socialist Communist IE Democratic form of Government. FDR's Executive Order 6102 (TREASON) suspended the Constitution and declared Marshal Law. 6102 did 2-things. 1) set the stage to steal the treasury of this nation and 2) destroyed the Constitution.

FDR fired the entire Federal Branch of Government: legislative, executive and judicial and set himself up as a Dictator or shall I say a De Facto Government. There are over 110 Congressional Corporations established since 1933. All courts are incorporated. All judges incorporated and traded daily on D&B: commodities fraud and money laundering for the FED via Bonding and CUSIPS.


Ohio Administrative Code
» 5101:6 Hearings
» Chapter 5101:6-50 Revised Code Chapter 119 Hearings



5101:6-50-09 Chapter 119. hearings: conduct of the hearing and adjudication order.


(A) Conduct of the hearing

(1) The date, time, and place of any hearing before ODJFS is set by ODJFS or the hearing examiner. The hearing examiner will provide written or electronic notice before the date of the hearing to all participants in the hearing and file a copy of the written notice with the depository agent. Hearings are to be scheduled in accordance with the following requirements.

(a) All hearings will be conducted in Columbus during normal business hours unless other times are authorized by the director.

(b) Upon the written request of the appellant, the director may designate the site of the hearing to be the county seat of the county wherein the appellant resides or, alternately, a place within fifty miles of the appellant’s residence. The approval of an alternative location is at the discretion of the director. Requests for an alternative hearing site must be filed with the depository agent at least thirty days before the scheduled date of the hearing and served as provided in rule 5101:6-50-07 of the Administrative Code.

(c) Once begun, any hearing normally continues day to day until completed, unless continued by the hearing officer for good cause shown.

(2) Subject to the prior approval of the hearing examiner, any appellant may choose to present the case entirely in writing provided that a written request is made by the appellant no later than fourteen business days before the date scheduled for the hearing. Any request to present the case entirely in writing must be filed with the depository agent and served as provided in rule 5101:6-50-07 of the Administrative Code. Any appellant who elects to present the case entirely in writing must do so in accordance with procedures ordered by the hearing examiner. The hearing examiner’s order must be in writing and filed with the depository agent. In the event that the appellant elects to present its case in writing, ODJFS, with the consent of the appellant, may elect to present its case entirely in writing. Nothing in this rule is to be construed as preventing ODJFS from compelling the attendance of the appellant or other witnesses at the hearing and questioning the appellant or other witnesses as if on cross-examination. Nothing in this rule is to be construed as preventing any appellant from examining any witnesses or evidence presented by ODJFS at the hearing.

(3) During the course of any hearing, the participants to the proceeding may enter into oral stipulations of fact, procedure, or the authenticity of documents, which will be incorporated into the record and will bind the conduct of the participants. The hearing examiner conducting the case may require oral stipulations to be reduced to writing and submitted to the hearing examiner. The hearing examiner assigned to conduct a hearing has the power to rule on the admissibility of evidence or testimony, but a participant may make objections to the rulings thereon. If the hearing examiner refuses to admit evidence or testimony, the participant seeking admission of same must make a proffer thereof and such proffer will be made a part of the record of the hearing. The hearing examiner may refer to the guidelines contained in the Ohio Rules of Evidence (7/1/2007) in making decisions on admissibility.

(4) Any audit report, report of examination, exit conference report, or report of final settlement issued by ODJFS and entered into evidence is to be considered prima facie evidence of what it asserts and its admissibility is not subject to the consent of the appellant pursuant to paragraph (B) of this rule.

(B) Findings of fact, conclusions of law, recommendations, and objections

(1) Upon the conclusion of any hearing, the hearing examiner will prepare a written report of findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of action to be taken by ODJFS in disposition of the hearing. The report must be filed with the depository agent. Within five days of the report’s filing with the depository agent, as evidenced by the time stamp of the agent, ODJFS will send by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appellant, the appellant’s attorney, or other authorized representative of record a copy of the hearing examiner’s report. The report will be considered to have been mailed as of the mailing date appearing on United States postal service form 3800, or any future equivalent postal service form. If delivery is not successful by certified mail, the applicable provisions of section 119.07 of the Revised Code shall be followed.

(2) An appellant may file written objections to the hearing examiner’s report. Any such objections must be received no later than ten days after the appellant receives the report. The director may grant an extension of time to file objections if the appellant’s written request for an extension is received by ODJFS no later than ten days after the appellant’s receipt of the report. The date the appellant receives the hearing examiner’s report is the receipt date indicated on the United States postal service form 3800, or any future equivalent postal services form. The director will consider timely written objections before approving, modifying, or disapproving the recommendations of the hearing examiner.

(C) Final order of adjudication

(1) Recommendations of the hearing examiner may be approved, modified, or disapproved by the director. The director may order additional testimony to be taken and permit the introduction of further documentary evidence. In those instances where the director modifies or disapproves the recommendations of the hearing examiner, the director will include the reasons therefor and incorporate said reasons into the final order of adjudication.

(2) After the director has entered an order approving, modifying, or disapproving the hearing examiner’s recommendation on the ODJFS journal of proceedings, the director will mail to the appellant by certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the order and a statement of the time and method by which an appeal may be perfected. A copy of such order shall be mailed to the attorney or other authorized representative of record representing the party.

(D) Appeal of final adjudication order

(1) Any appellant other than a licensee against whom a final order of adjudication is entered, pursuant to this rule, may appeal that order to the Franklin county court of common pleas. Any licensee against whom a final order of adjudication is entered, pursuant to the this rule, may appeal that order to the court of common pleas of the county in which the place of business of the licensee is located or the county in which the licensee is a resident.

(2) Any party desiring an appeal pursuant to this rule must file a notice of appeal with the proper depository agent setting forth the order appealed from and stating that the agency’s order is not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is not in accordance with the law. The notice may, but need not, set forth the specific grounds of the party’s appeal beyond the statement that the agency’s order is not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is not in accordance with the law. In order to be determined filed with ODJFS, the notice of appeal must be received by the proper depository agent, as evidenced by an ODJFS date and time stamp, no later than fifteen days after the mailing to the affected party, as evidenced by the mailing date on the United States postal service form 3800, or any future equivalent postal service form, of the order to be appealed from. Appellant shall also file the notice of appeal with the court of common pleas no later than fifteen days after the mailing to the affected party, as evidenced by United States postal service form 3800, or any future equivalent postal service form, of the order to be appealed from. In filing a notice of appeal with the agency or court, the notice that is filed may be the original notice or a copy of the original notice.

Effective: 01/20/2011

R.C. 119.032 review dates: 10/01/2013

Promulgated Under: 119.03

Statutory Authority: 5101.02

Rule Amplifies: 119.06, 119.07, 119.09, 119.12, 1701.07, 1703.19, 5101.24, 5103.12, 5104.03, 5104.04, 5111.02, 5111.06

Prior Effective Dates: 1/1/83, 1/10/87, 12/1/87 (Emer), 2/15/88, 2/1/99, 4/1/04, 10/1/08