Juvenile Court Lacked Jurisdiction to End Parental Rights and Order Adoption Part 2

REL: 3/25/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
2100050
_________________________
R.L.
v.
J.E.R. and S.L.R.
Appeal from Calhoun Juvenile Court
(JU-10-08.01)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
R.L. ("the mother") appeals from a judgment of the
Calhoun Juvenile Court terminating her parental rights to
2100050
The judgment also terminated the parental rights of the 1
child's father. The identity of the father was unknown; the
child's birth certificate, which is included in the record,
does not include information regarding the father. Notice of
the termination hearing was served by publication to any
putative father. No one claiming to be the child's father has
participated in these proceedings at any level.
Although it is not entirely clear from the record on 2
appeal, from the mother's testimony it appears that she had
been placed on probation after a conviction for possession of
marijuana.
2
I.M.L. ("the child"). Six days after entering the judgment 1
terminating the mother's parental rights, the juvenile court
entered a second judgment allowing J.E.R. and S.L.R. ("the
adoptive parents") to adopt the child.
The record indicates the following. The mother lives in
Georgia. The child's birth certificate indicates that he was
born in Riverdale, Georgia, on January 30, 2009; the mother
testified, however, that she believed the child was born on
January 31, 2009. After the child was born, he lived with the
mother in Georgia.
The mother testified that she became aware that an arrest
warrant had been issued for her and that she was facing up to
six months in prison for violating the terms of her
probation. The mother testified that her aunt told her that 2
2100050
3
the adoptive parents were unable to have children and wanted
to adopt a baby. Because the mother was not getting along
with her own mother at the time, she said, she agreed to allow
the adoptive parents to have temporary custody of the child
while she was in jail.
On August 29, 2009, the adoptive parents, who live in
Piedmont, Alabama, traveled to Georgia to take physical
custody of the child. On that day, the mother signed a
document titled "Power of Attorney Delegating Parental
Rights," which allowed the adoptive parents to have custody of
the child for six months unless earlier revoked by the mother.
The mother's signature does not appear on a separate document
in the record titled "Single Parent Consent to Adoption," and
the mother testified that she did not intend for the adoptive
parents to adopt the child. However, the adoptive parents
testified that they believed the mother had intended for the
arrangement to be permanent, and their intention at that time
was to adopt the child. The adoptive parents returned to
Piedmont with the child on August 29, 2009.
The mother was incarcerated shortly after the adoptive
parents took custody of the child. On September 17, 2009, the
2100050
4
adoptive parents filed in the Calhoun Probate Court a petition
seeking to adopt the child. The mother was served with the
petition while she was still incarcerated in Georgia. The
mother testified that she served about one month in jail for
the probation violation. After the mother was released from
jail, the probate court held a hearing on the matter of the
child's adoption. The mother attended the hearing and
contested the adoption. On December 16, 2009, the probate
court entered an order transferring the matter to the juvenile
court "for further disposition."
On June 3, 2010, the juvenile court held a hearing during
which evidence was presented ore tenus. At the outset of the
hearing, the mother moved to dismiss the proceedings because,
she said, the child's home state was Georgia; thus, she
asserted, the juvenile court had no jurisdiction over the
child. The juvenile court denied the mother's motion to
dismiss, stating that the issue of jurisdiction had not been
raised in the probate court and noting that, at the time of
the juvenile court hearing, the child had been in Alabama for
nine months.
2100050
5
On September 9, 2010, the juvenile court entered a
judgment finding that the child was dependent and terminating
the mother's parental rights. On September 15, 2010, the
juvenile court entered a judgment granting the adoptive
parents' petition to adopt the child. On September 22, 2010,
the mother filed a motion for relief from the judgment
terminating her parental rights pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4),
Ala. R. Civ. P., on the ground that the judgment was void for
lack of jurisdiction. Pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.,
she also filed a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or
vacate the judgment terminating her parental rights. The
postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate was deemed
denied by operation of law on October 6, 2010. See Rule 1(B),
Ala. R. Juv. P. We note, however, that a motion filed
pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., is not subject to
being denied by operation of law. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ.
P.; see also Ex parte Keith, 771 So. 2d 1018, 1021 (Ala.
1998). Even though the juvenile court never ruled on the
mother's Rule 60(b)(4) motion, a motion filed pursuant to
Rule 60(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. Ex parte R.S.C., 853 So. 2d 228, 233-
2100050
6
34 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). Therefore, the mother's appeal to
this court was not premature and was timely filed.
The mother contends that the judgment terminating her
parental rights to the child is void because, she says,
Georgia is the child's home state; thus, she asserts, the
juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over the child. This
action began with a petition for adoption, filed in the
probate court. The jurisdiction of Alabama courts in adoption
matters is set forth in § 26-10A-3, Ala. Code 1975, which
provides:
"The probate court shall have original
jurisdiction over proceedings brought under the
chapter. If any party whose consent is required
fails to consent or is unable to consent, the
proceeding will be transferred to the court having
jurisdiction over juvenile matters for the limited
purpose of termination of parental rights. The
provisions of this chapter shall be applicable to
proceedings in the court having jurisdiction over
juvenile matters."
(Emphasis added.) The mother refused to consent to the
adoption; therefore, pursuant to § 26-10A-3, the probate court
was required to transfer the matter to the court having
jurisdiction to determine whether the mother's parental rights
were due to be terminated.
2100050
7
Alabama has adopted the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), codified at §
30-3B-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, to govern child-custody
disputes involving, or potentially involving, more than one
jurisdiction. A "child-custody proceeding" is defined in the
UCCJEA to include not only divorce actions involving the
custody of a child, but also, among others, "dependency, ...
[and] termination of parental rights" actions in which the
issue of child custody is addressed. § 30-3B-102(4). The
term "child-custody proceeding" does not include an adoption
proceeding. Id.
In D.B. v. M.A., 975 So. 2d 927, 937 (Ala. 2006), this
court held that, in a consolidated adoption and custody case
such as the case at bar, when a juvenile court must determine
whether to terminate a parent's parental rights before
adoption proceedings can continue, the UCCJEA applies to the
custody determination. Section 30-3B-201 of the UCCJEA sets
forth the following relevant requirements that must be met for
a trial court to have subject-matter jurisdiction over a
child-custody determination:
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8
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section
30-3B-204, a court of this state has jurisdiction to
make an initial child custody determination only if:
"(1) This state is the home state of
the child on the date of the commencement
of the proceeding, or was the home state of
the child within six months before the
commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this state but a
parent or person acting as a parent
continues to live in this state;
"(2) A court of another state does not
have jurisdiction under subdivision (1), or
a court of the home state of the child has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that this state is the more
appropriate forum under Section 30-3B-207
or 30-3B-208, and:
"a. The child and the
child's parents, or the child and
at least one parent or a person
acting as a parent, have a
significant connection with this
state other than mere physical
presence; and
"b. Substantial evidence is
available in this state
concerning the child's care,
protection, training, and
personal relationships;
"(3) All courts having jurisdiction
under subdivision (1) or (2) have declined
to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that
a court of this state is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody
of the child under Section 30-3B-207 or
30-3B-208; or
2100050
9
"(4) No court of any other state would
have jurisdiction under the criteria
specified in subdivision (1), (2), or (3).
"(b) Subsection (a) is the exclusive
jurisdictional basis for making a child custody
determination by a court of this state."
The UCCJEA defines "home state" as "[t]he state in which a
child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for
at least six consecutive months immediately before the
commencement of a child custody proceeding." § 30-3B-102(7),
Ala. Code 1975. The definition further notes that "[a]
temporary absence of the child or any of the mentioned persons
is part of the period." Id.
At the time the adoption proceeding was initiated, aside
from the child's "temporary absence" from Georgia while he was
in the adoptive parents' custody, the child had lived with his
mother in Georgia for six consecutive months immediately
preceding the filing of the adoption petition, and the mother
continued to live in Georgia during the child's "temporary
absence"; thus, Georgia was the child's home state. See § 30-
3B-102(7), Ala. Code 1975. Even if we were to consider the
termination-of-parental-rights proceeding as a separate
proceeding, the probate court transferred the matter to the
2100050
10
juvenile court on December 16, 2009, approximately three and
one-half months after the adoptive parents took the child from
Georgia; thus, the child had not resided in Alabama for six
consecutive months immediately preceding the litigation.
Therefore, we conclude that Georgia was the child's home state
at the commencement of the proceedings. See § 30-3B-102(7).
Because Alabama was not the home state of the child, an
Alabama court could not make an initial custody determination
unless (1) Georgia had declined to exercise jurisdiction, (2)
the child and at least one parent or person acting as the
child's parent had significant connections with Alabama, and
(3) substantial evidence concerning the child's care,
protection, training and personal relationships was available
for the Alabama court's review. See § 30-3B-201(a)(2), Ala.
Code 1975, (emphasis added). There is no evidence in the
record to indicate that a Georgia court had declined to
exercise jurisdiction over the issue of the child's custody;
thus, an Alabama court could not properly make a determination
regarding the mother's parental rights, which would
2100050
The exception to the inability of a court to exercise 3
jurisdiction when the prerequisites of § 30-3B-201 are not met
is when a court exercises "emergency jurisdiction" under the
UCCJEA. Section 30-3B-204(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that
an Alabama court "has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the
child is present in this state and the child has been
abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the
child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child,
is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse."
The UCCJEA defines "abandoned" as "[l]eft without provision
for reasonable and necessary care or supervision." § 30-3B-
102(1), Ala. Code 1975. In this case, the mother had made
provision for the child's reasonable and necessary care or
supervision by making arrangements for the adoptive parents to
have custody of the child while the mother was incarcerated
and by executing the "Power of Attorney Delegating Parental
Rights." There is no allegation that the adoptive parents
have abandoned the child or that the child has been
mistreated, abused, or threatened with abuse while in the
adoptive parents' custody. Thus, the juvenile court's
"emergency jurisdiction" would not have been triggered in this
case.
11
necessarily involve an initial child-custody determination as
to the child. 3
Based on the record before us and the authority cited
earlier, we hold that the juvenile court did not have
jurisdiction to terminate the mother's parental rights.
"Without subject-matter jurisdiction, any judgment entered in
the action is void." Eagerton v. Second Econ. Dev. Coop.
Dist. of Lowndes County, 909 So. 2d 783, 788 (Ala. 2005). A
void judgment will not support an appeal. T.B. v. T.H., 30
2100050
12
So. 3d 429, 433 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009). Accordingly, we
dismiss the mother's appeal as being from a void judgment, and
we remand this cause to the juvenile court to vacate the
judgment terminating the mother's parental rights.
Although the mother did not explicitly appeal from the
juvenile court's judgment of adoption, this court must sua
sponte recognize and address the juvenile court's lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction to enter that judgment, because
"'this Court is duty bound to notice ex mero motu the absence
of subject-matter jurisdiction.'" Baldwin County v. Bay
Minette, 854 So. 2d 42, 45 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Stamps v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 642 So. 2d 941, 945 n.2 (Ala.
1994)).
In Ex parte C.L.C., 897 So. 2d 234, 238 (Ala. 2004), our
supreme court held that, generally, a juvenile court does not
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment of adoption. The court
in C.L.C. explained its holding as follows:
"'"Adoption is not merely an arrangement between the
natural parents and adoptive parents, but is a
status created by the state acting as parens
patriae, the sovereign parent. Because the exercise
of sovereign power involved in adoption curtails the
fundamental rights of the natural parent[s], the
adoption statutes must be closely adhered to."' Ex
parte Sullivan, 407 So. 2d 559, 563 (Ala. 1981)
2100050
The "transfer" mechanism provided for in § 12-12-35 4
requires the filing of a motion by a party to the probate
court adoption proceeding to transfer the action to the
district court.
13
(quoting Davis v. Turner, 337 So. 2d 355, 360-61
(Ala. Civ. App. 1976)).
"'Once jurisdiction has attached in one court,
that court has the exclusive right to continue its
exercise of power until the completion of the case,
and is only subject to appellate authority.' Wesson
v. Wesson, 628 So. 2d 953, 953 (Ala. Civ. App.
1993). '[W]hen [a] court has no power to sit, nor
has general jurisdiction over that nature of
proceeding or over the parties, it cannot make any
effective order.' Carter v. Mitchell, 225 Ala. 287,
292, 142 So. 514, 518 (1932).
"The 'primary jurisdiction over adoption
proceedings is in the probate court.' B.W.C. v.
A.N.M., 590 So. 2d 282, 283 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991).
'[U]nless [a] juvenile court acquire[s] jurisdiction
over a petition to adopt by the "transfer" mechanism
found in § 12-12-35, [Ala.] Code 1975, the [4]
juvenile court [is] without authority to grant an
adoption.' B.W.C., 590 So. 2d at 283.
"The probate court kept exclusive jurisdiction
over the issue of whether or not to grant or deny
the petition to adopt. Wesson, supra. The probate
court, pursuant to the authority of § 26-10A-3, sent
the case to the juvenile court for the strictly
limited purpose of addressing the issue of
termination of parental rights, and the juvenile
court acquired only that limited jurisdiction over
this particular case. See Martin v. Martin, 173
Ala. 106, 55 So. 632 (1911), Ex parte Pearson, 241
Ala. 467, 3 So. 2d 5 (1941), and B.W.C., supra. The
juvenile court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
issue of whether to grant the petition to adopt, as
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14
that jurisdiction remained exclusively in the
probate court. See Wesson and B.W.C., supra.
"Therefore, in purporting to grant the petition
to adopt, the juvenile court exceeded its
jurisdiction and entered only a void judgment. See
State ex rel. Payne v. Empire Life Ins. Co. of
America, 351 So. 2d 538 (Ala. 1977), Ex parte
McKivett, 55 Ala. 236 (1876), and Knight v. Taylor
Real Estate & Ins. Co., 38 Ala. App. 295, 83 So. 2d
353 (1955). A related but independent analysis is
that, in exceeding the limited mandate of the
probate court, the juvenile court exceeded its
jurisdiction and entered only a void judgment. See
Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 431 So. 2d 151 (Ala.
1983), and Smith v. State, 852 So. 2d 185 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2001)."
Ex parte C.L.C., 897 So. 2d at 237-38.
In this case, no party to the adoption proceeding filed
a motion to transfer the case to the juvenile court,
therefore, § 12-12-35, Ala. Code 1975, the statute creating
the "transfer" mechanism referred to in the quote above, is
not applicable here. Pursuant to the authority of § 26-10A-3,
the probate court sent the case to the juvenile court strictly
for the limited purpose of addressing the issue of termination
of parental rights, and the probate court retained
jurisdiction over the adoption petition. Therefore, on the
authority of C.L.C., we conclude that the juvenile court did
not have jurisdiction to enter the judgment of adoption.
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15
Accordingly, that judgment is also void, and the cause is
remanded for the juvenile court to vacate the adoption
judgment as well.
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO JUVENILE COURT.
Pittman, Bryan, Thomas, and Moore, JJ., concur.

Juvenile Court Lacked Jurisdiction to End Parental Rights and Order Adoption

http://www.alabamaappellatewatch.com/2011/03/articles/appellate-jurisdiction-1/juvenile-court-lacked-jurisdiction-to-end-parental-rights-and-order-adoption/


The juvenile court terminated a mother’s parental rights, and ordered that her minor child be adopted by another couple. The court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to do either thing. The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the mother’s appeal regarding her parental rights; and it ordered the juvenile court to vacate both orders. R.L. v. J.E.R., No. 2100050 (Ala. Civ. App. Mar. 25, 2011).

Prospective adoptive parents filed a petition in the probate court to adopt the mother’s minor child. The mother contested the adoption. The probate court transferred the case to juvenile court “for further disposition.” The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights and then ordered the adoption.

The mother filed postjudgment motions challenging the termination of her parental rights. She moved to alter, amend, or vacate that judgment under Rule 59(e). She also moved to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4), arguing that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, so that its termination order was void. The juvenile court did not rule on her motions. The Rule 59(e) motion was denied by operation of law. Motions under Rule 60(b), the Court of Civil Appeals reminded readers, are not subject to denial by operation of law; neither do they “affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.” The mother’s eventual appeal thus was not premature and was timely.

The Court of Civil Appeals found that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter both the parental-rights and the adoption judgments. Because the child’s home state was Georgia, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to terminate the mother’s parental rights under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Ala. Code §§ 30-3B-101 to -405). Its order was consequently void. Void orders will not support an appeal. The appellate court dismissed the mother’s appeal and ordered the juvenile court to vacate its order terminating the mother’s parental rights.

The adoption order met a similar end. The probate court had not effectively transferred jurisdiction over the adoption petition to the juvenile court. Under Ala. Code § 12-12-35, to transfer an adoption case from the probate to the district court, a party must move the probate court for such a transfer. No party had done this. The juvenile court thus lacked power to order an adoption, and its judgment doing so was void. The Court of Civil Appeals noticed this lack of jurisdiction on its own motion. It remanded the case for the juvenile court to vacate its adoption judgment.

Judgment vacating termination of mother's parental rights reversed

http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A141958.htm


Petition Number 050415J01
Clackamas County Circuit Court
050415J
A141958

Deanne L. Darling, Judge.

Argued and submitted on October 06, 2009.

Christina Hutchins, Senior Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant - cross-respondent. With her on the briefs were John Kroger, Attorney General, and Jerome Lidz, Solicitor General.

Gay Canaday argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent - cross-appellant J. L. J., Sr.

No appearance for respondent L. L. L.

Ann Lechman-Su argued the cause for respondent C. J. With her on the briefs was Johnson & Lechman-Su, PC.

Before Wollheim, Presiding Judge, and Brewer, Chief Judge, and Sercombe, Judge.*

WOLLHEIM, P. J.

*Brewer, C. J., vice Edmonds, P. J.

Judgment vacating termination of mother's parental rights reversed; otherwise affirmed.

WOLLHEIM, P. J.

The Department of Human Services (the department) appeals judgments of the juvenile court dismissing child's commitment to the custody of the department, approving child's placement with father, and vacating a judgment terminating mother's parental rights. Father cross-assigns error to the juvenile court's denial of his motion for guardianship as moot. We review the record de novo, ORS 419A.200(6)(b) (2007),(1) the juvenile court's procedural rulings for abuse of discretion, and its legal conclusions for errors of law. State ex rel SOSCF v. Dennis, 173 Or App 604, 606, 25 P3d 341, rev den, 332 Or 558 (2001). Based on that review, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

In 2005, child was found to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and was placed in foster care. Thereafter, following a trial held in January 2007, the juvenile court entered a judgment terminating mother's parental rights. On January 8, 2007, father signed a document (the release) "for the purpose of adoption" that relinquished custody and control of child to the department and authorized the department to consent to an adoption of child. On the same date, father signed a certificate of irrevocability agreeing that the release would become irrevocable as soon as the department placed child "in the physical custody of a person or persons for the purpose of adoption by them." At that time, child was living with a foster family whom the department had identified as a potential adoptive placement. However, child was not adopted and was ultimately removed from that foster family and placed with a different foster family.

In 2008, the department re-evaluated father as a possible placement for child and determined that he had significantly improved his circumstances. Father, at the direction of the department and the juvenile court, participated in a psychiatric evaluation, counseling, and other services. He also began visits with child, who was 12 years old at the time and had informed the court of her desire to have such visits. Thereafter, having determined that father could adequately parent child and in light of child's expressed desire to return to her father's care, the juvenile court ordered that the primary case plan for child be changed from adoption or guardianship to reunification with father. After an additional period of time during which child's visits with father increased, a family decision meeting was held at which the parties agreed that child should be returned to father. Father then filed a motion for a shelter hearing in which he requested that the juvenile court approve child's placement with him or, in the alternative, appoint him as her guardian. At the hearing, all the parties agreed that it was in child's best interest to be placed with father. However, the department represented that, because of the release, it could not certify father as a placement for child.

After the hearing, the juvenile court entered a judgment approving child's placement with father, dismissing child's commitment to the custody of the department, and continuing child as a ward of the court. In addition, on its own motion, the court entered a judgment vacating and setting aside the earlier judgment terminating mother's parental rights. In that judgment, the court noted that "the plan is no longer adoption; the child does not consent to adoption [and] the father is an appropriate parent." Neither mother nor her attorney had been notified of or was present at the hearing.

In its first and third assignments of error, the department takes issue with the juvenile court's treatment of the release and its dismissal of the department's custody over child. In essence, the department takes the position that the release precluded the juvenile court from treating father as an ordinary parent with whom child could be reunified. The issue we must address, then, is whether, in light of the release, the juvenile court properly approved child's return to father and dismissed child's commitment to the department's custody.

ORS 418.270 provides for documents such as the release at issue in this case. Although, by its terms, that statute applies to "private child-caring agenc[ies]," pursuant to ORS 418.285, "the Department of Human Services has the same authority as a private-child caring agency under ORS 418.270 to 418.280. In exercising this authority, the department shall comply with the provisions of ORS 418.270 to 418.280 the same as a private child-caring agency." Under ORS 418.270(1), a parent may "sign releases or surrenders giving [a private child-caring agency] guardianship and control of [children received by the agency for care] during the period of such care, which may be extended until the children arrive at legal age." In addition, a release may surrender the rights of the parent with respect to adoption and entitle such an agency to consent to adoption of a child if the "release or surrender expressly recites that it is given for the purpose of adoption." Id. When a release or surrender is given for the purpose of adoption, the parent may also,

"without any adoption proceeding having been initiated, agree that the release or surrender shall become irrevocable as soon as the child is placed by the agency in the physical custody of a person or persons for the purpose of adoption by them, and waive their right to personal appearance in court in matters of adoption of such children, by a duly signed and attested certificate. From and after such physical placement for adoption such certificate of irrevocability and waiver and the release or surrender may not be revoked by the parent or guardian unless fraud or duress is affirmatively proved."

ORS 418.270(4). Thus, the statute provides a mechanism for parents to relinquish both custody of their children and the right to consent to the adoption of those children and also restricts the ability of such parents to revoke such a relinquishment. Importantly, no provision of the statutes at issue purports to limit the juvenile court's jurisdiction or authority over a child who is the subject of a release like that executed by father in this case. Furthermore, a surrender does not, itself, effect a termination or severance of a child's relationship with his or her parent. Rather, such a severance can be accomplished only by way of a court order. ORS 418.270(2) ("Any entire severance of family ties of [a child for whom a release or surrender has been executed] by adoption or otherwise shall be accomplished only by the order of a court of competent jurisdiction"); see also ORS 419B.498 - 419B.524 (concerning termination of parental rights).

The proper role of the juvenile court in this case was to protect the child and, where possible and in child's best interest, promote the return of child to her parent. "Juvenile courts administering [dependency] statutes 'act in parens patriae, focusing on family unity and the best interests of the child.'" State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. W. P., 345 Or 657, 662, 202 P3d 167 (2009) (quoting State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist, 310 Or 176, 189, 796 P2d 1193 (1990)); see also ORS 419B.090(2)(c) (dependency statutes are to be liberally construed to protect the welfare of children within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court); ORS 419B.090(3) ("It is the policy of the State of Oregon to safeguard and promote each child's right to safety, stability and well-being. The State of Oregon recognizes the importance of a child's relationships with parents, siblings, grandparents and other relatives."); ORS 419B.090(5) (recognizing "strong preference that children live in their own homes with their own families"). In light of its role in the context of dependency proceedings, the juvenile court in this case properly focused on achieving the outcome that all the parties, including the department, agreed was in child's best interest--reunification with her father.

As well, contrary to the department's contention, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing child's commitment to the department's custody once she was reunified with father. ORS 419B.337(6) provides that "[c]ommitment of a ward [of the court] to the Department of Human Services continues until dismissed by the court or until the ward becomes 21 years of age." The court can appropriately dismiss a commitment where "the ward has been safely reunited with a parent[.]" ORS 419B.337(7)(a)(A); see also ORS 419A.004(16) (defining "parent" as used in ORS chapters 419A, 419B, and 419C). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court acts outside the boundaries established by law. State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Garcia, 180 Or App 279, 286, 44 P3d 591 (2002). Here, given that child was reunited with father, whose familial ties with child had never been severed by a court, the juvenile court acted within the scope of its authority when it dismissed child's commitment to the custody of the department. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion.

We next turn to the department's assertion that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it, on its own motion, set aside and vacated the judgment terminating mother's parental rights to child. Specifically, the department points out that the judgment in question had been entered more than two years earlier and affirmed on appeal, that there was no motion to set aside the termination judgment, and that neither mother nor her representative were present at or provided notice of the proceeding. Although father makes no argument with respect to that issue, child contends that, in setting aside the judgment terminating mother's parental rights, the trial court acted properly within its authority pursuant to ORS 419B.923(8), which provides that the juvenile court retains inherent power to modify a judgment within a reasonable time or to set aside a judgment based on fraud upon the court. Here, there was no contention that the termination order had been the result of fraud upon the court. However, child takes the position that the juvenile court's judgment vacating and setting aside the prior termination judgment constituted a modification completed within a reasonable time pursuant to ORS 419B.923(8).

Pursuant to ORS 419B.923(1), "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, on motion and such notice and hearing as the court may direct, the court may modify or set aside any order or judgment made by it." ORS 419B.923(3) provides, in part, that "a motion to modify or set aside an order or judgment must be made within a reasonable time * * *." The department and child agree that, because there was no motion by any party requesting that the court vacate the termination judgment, ORS 419B.923(1) does not apply in this case. However, as noted above, under ORS 419B.923(8), the juvenile court nevertheless retains inherent authority to "modify an order or judgment within a reasonable time or * * * set aside an order or judgment for fraud upon the court."

We recently considered an issue similar to that raised by child in Dept. of Human Services v. B. A. S./J. S., 232 Or App 245, __ P3d __ (2009). In that case, the issue was whether an appeal from a judgment of the juvenile court was moot in light of the fact that adoption proceedings involving the children had been completed while the appeal was pending. In the process of resolving that question, we considered whether "'modifying' the judgment within the meaning of [ORS 419B.923(8)] could reasonably be understood to also encompass setting it aside." Id. at 254. In other words, in a case where there was no allegation of fraud on the court, could the juvenile court, nonetheless, set aside a judgment based on its power to modify that judgment within a reasonable time? Ultimately, however, we concluded that "even if the court's power to 'modify' that is recognized in [ORS 419B.923(8)] can be understood to include vacating the judgment entirely," it would still be necessary for the particular circumstances presented to bring the case within the scope of the court's inherent power to vacate. Id. at 258.

As we observed in B. A. S./J. S., "[i]t is well settled that a trial court can exercise its inherent authority to vacate a judgment only to make a technical amendment, to correct an error of the court, or in other extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 258 (quoting Kneefel v. McLaughlin, 187 Or App 1, 5-6, 67 P3d 947 (2003); internal quotation marks omitted). "Extraordinary circumstances" generally involve fraud or overreaching by a party, duress, breach of fiduciary duty, or gross inequity. B. A. S./J. S., 232 Or App at 258-59. Admittedly, the facts of this case may be seen as unusual. However, the type of "extraordinary circumstances" described above that would permit the court to vacate the judgment are not present in this case. Accordingly, even assuming that the juvenile court's inherent authority to modify a judgment within a reasonable time, as recognized by ORS 419B.923(8), includes the power to vacate such a judgment entirely, the circumstances presented in this case were not sufficient to trigger that authority. For that reason, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it vacated the judgment terminating mother's parental rights.(2)

Judgment vacating termination of mother's parental rights reversed; otherwise affirmed.

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR TITLE IV-E FOSTER CARE e-book

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR TITLE IV-E FOSTER CARE e-book

http://www.scribd.com/doc/66143903/IV-E-MANUAL

Federal foster care program title IV-E State

REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO TITLE IV-E
http://law.justia.com/cfr/title45/45-4.1.2.7.18.html



45 C.F.R. PART 1356—REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO TITLE IV-E
Title 45 - Public Welfare



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PART 1356—REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO TITLE IV-E

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Section Contents
§ 1356.10 Scope.
§ 1356.20 State plan document and submission requirements.
§ 1356.21 Foster care maintenance payments program implementation requirements.
§ 1356.22 Implementation requirements for children voluntarily placed in foster care.
§ 1356.30 Safety requirements for foster care and adoptive home providers.
§ 1356.40 Adoption assistance program: Administrative requirements to implement section 473 of the Act.
§ 1356.41 Nonrecurring expenses of adoption.
§ 1356.50 Withholding of funds for non-compliance with the approved title IV-E State plan.
§ 1356.60 Fiscal requirements (title IV-E).
§§ 1356.65-1356.70 [Reserved]
§ 1356.71 Federal review of the eligibility of children in foster care and the eligibility of foster care providers in title IV-E programs.


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Authority: 42 U.S.C. 620 et seq., 42 U.S.C. 670 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 1302.

§ 1356.10 Scope.
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This part applies to State programs for foster care maintenance payments, adoption assistance payments, related foster care and adoption administrative and training expenditures, and the independent living services program under title IV-E of the Act.

[61 FR 58655, Nov. 18, 1996]

§ 1356.20 State plan document and submission requirements.
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(a) To be in compliance with the State plan requirements and to be eligible to receive Federal financial participation (FFP) in the costs of foster care maintenance payments and adoption assistance under this part, a State must have a State plan approved by the Secretary that meets the requirements of this part, part 1355 and section 471(a) of the Act. The title IV-E State plan must be submitted to the appropriate Regional Office, ACYF, in a form determined by the State.

(b) Failure by a State to comply with the requirements and standards for the data reporting system for foster care and adoption (§1355.40 of this chapter) shall be considered a substantial failure by the State in complying with the State plan for title IV-E. Penalties as described in §1355.40(e) of this chapter shall apply.

(c) If a State chooses to claim FFP for voluntary foster care placements, the State must meet the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section and section 102 of Pub. L. 96–272, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as it amends section 472 of the Act.

(d) The following procedures for approval of State plans and amendments apply to the title IV-E program:

(1) The State plan consists of written documents furnished by the State to cover its program under part E of title IV. After approval of the original plan by the Commissioner, ACYF, all relevant changes, required by new statutes, rules, regulations, interpretations, and court decisions, are required to be submitted currently so that ACYF may determine whether the plan continues to meet Federal requirements and policies.

(2) Submittal. State plans and revisions of the plans are submitted first to the State governor or his designee for review and then to the regional office, ACYF. The States are encouraged to obtain consultation of the regional staff when a plan is in process of preparation or revision.

(3) Review. Staff in the regional offices are responsible for review of State plans and amendments. They also initiate discussion with the State agency on clarification of significant aspects of the plan which come to their attention in the course of this review. State plan material on which the regional staff has questions concerning the application of Federal policy is referred with recommendations as required to the central office for technical assistance. Comments and suggestions, including those of consultants in specified areas, may be prepared by the central office for use by the regional staff in negotiations with the State agency.

(4) Action. Each Regional Administrator, ACF, has the authority to approve State plans and amendments thereto which provide for the administration of foster care maintenance payments and adoption assistance programs under section 471 of the Act. The Commissioner, ACYF, retains the authority to determine that proposed plan material is not approvable, or that a previously approved plan no longer meets the requirements for approval. The Regional Office, ACYF, formally notifies the State agency of the actions taken on State plans or revisions.

(5) Basis for approval. Determinations as to whether State plans (including plan amendments and administrative practice under the plans) originally meet or continue to meet, the requirements for approval are based on relevant Federal statutes and regulations.

(6) Prompt approval of State plans. The determination as to whether a State plan submitted for approval conforms to the requirements for approval under the Act and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall be made promptly and not later than the 45th day following the date on which the plan submittal is received in the regional office, unless the Regional Office, ACYF, has secured from the State agency a written agreement to extend that period.

(7) Prompt approval of plan amendments. Any amendment of an approved State plan may, at the option of the State, be considered as a submission of a new State plan. If the State requests that such amendment be so considered the determination as to its conformity with the requirements for approval shall be made promptly and not later than the 45th day following the date on which such a request is received in the regional office with respect to an amendment that has been received in such office, unless the Regional Office, ACYF, has secured from the State agency a written agreement to extend that period. In absence of request by a State that an amendment of an approved State plan shall be considered as a submission of a new State plan, the procedures under §201.6 (a) and (b) shall be applicable.

(8) Effective date. The effective date of a new plan may not be earlier than the first day of the calendar quarter in which an approvable plan is submitted, and with respect to expenditures for assistance under such plan, may not be earlier than the first day on which the plan is in operation on a statewide basis. The same applies with respect to plan amendments.

(e) Once the title IV-E State plan has been submitted and approved, it shall remain in effect until amendments are required. An amendment is required if there is any significant and relevant change in the information or assurances in the plan, or the organization, policies or operations described in the plan.
(This requirement has been approved by the Office of Management and Budget under OMB Control Number 0980–0141. In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.)
[48 FR 23115, May 23, 1983, as amended at 58 FR 67938, Dec. 22, 1993; 65 FR 4088, Jan. 25, 2000; 66 FR 58676, Nov. 23, 2001]

§ 1356.21 Foster care maintenance payments program implementation requirements.
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(a) Statutory and regulatory requirements of the Federal foster care program. To implement the foster care maintenance payments program provisions of the title IV-E State plan and to be eligible to receive Federal financial participation (FFP) for foster care maintenance payments under this part, a State must meet the requirements of this section, 45 CFR 1356.22, 45 CFR 1356.30, and sections 472, 475(1), 475(4), 475(5) and 475(6) of the Act.

(b) Reasonable efforts. The State must make reasonable efforts to maintain the family unit and prevent the unnecessary removal of a child from his/her home, as long as the child's safety is assured; to effect the safe reunification of the child and family (if temporary out-of-home placement is necessary to ensure the immediate safety of the child); and to make and finalize alternate permanency plans in a timely manner when reunification is not appropriate or possible. In order to satisfy the “reasonable efforts” requirements of section 471(a)(15) (as implemented through section 472(a)(1) of the Act), the State must meet the requirements of paragraphs (b) and (d) of this section. In determining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a child and in making such reasonable efforts, the child's health and safety must be the State's paramount concern.

(1) Judicial determination of reasonable efforts to prevent a child's removal from the home. (i) When a child is removed from his/her home, the judicial determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made, or were not required to prevent the removal, in accordance with paragraph (b)(3) of this section, must be made no later than 60 days from the date the child is removed from the home pursuant to paragraph (k)(1)(ii) of this section.

(ii) If the determination concerning reasonable efforts to prevent the removal is not made as specified in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section, the child is not eligible under the title IV-E foster care maintenance payments program for the duration of that stay in foster care.

(2) Judicial determination of reasonable efforts to finalize a permanency plan. (i) The State agency must obtain a judicial determination that it has made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan that is in effect (whether the plan is reunification, adoption, legal guardianship, placement with a fit and willing relative, or placement in another planned permanent living arrangement) within twelve months of the date the child is considered to have entered foster care in accordance with the definition at §1355.20 of this part, and at least once every twelve months thereafter while the child is in foster care.

(ii) If such a judicial determination regarding reasonable efforts to finalize a permanency plan is not made in accordance with the schedule prescribed in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section, the child becomes ineligible under title IV-E at the end of the month in which the judicial determination was required to have been made, and remains ineligible until such a determination is made.

(3) Circumstances in which reasonable efforts are not required to prevent a child's removal from home or to reunify the child and family. Reasonable efforts to prevent a child's removal from home or to reunify the child and family are not required if the State agency obtains a judicial determination that such efforts are not required because:

(i) A court of competent jurisdiction has determined that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse);

(ii) A court of competent jurisdiction has determined that the parent has been convicted of:

(A) Murder (which would have been an offense under section 1111(a) of title 18, United States Code, if the offense had occurred in the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States) of another child of the parent;

(B) Voluntary manslaughter (which would have been an offense under section 1112(a) of title 18, United States Code, if the offense had occurred in the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States) of another child of the parent;

(C) Aiding or abetting, attempting, conspiring, or soliciting to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter; or

(D) A felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent; or,

(iii) The parental rights of the parent with respect to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily.

(4) Concurrent planning. Reasonable efforts to finalize an alternate permanency plan may be made concurrently with reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family.

(5) Use of the Federal Parent Locator Service. The State agency may seek the services of the Federal Parent Locator Service to search for absent parents at any point in order to facilitate a permanency plan.

(c) Contrary to the welfare determination. Under section 472(a)(1) of the Act, a child's removal from the home must have been the result of a judicial determination (unless the child was removed pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement) to the effect that continuation of residence in the home would be contrary to the welfare, or that placement would be in the best interest, of the child. The contrary to the welfare determination must be made in the first court ruling that sanctions (even temporarily) the removal of a child from home. If the determination regarding contrary to the welfare is not made in the first court ruling pertaining to removal from the home, the child is not eligible for title IV-E foster care maintenance payments for the duration of that stay in foster care.

(d) Documentation of judicial determinations. The judicial determinations regarding contrary to the welfare, reasonable efforts to prevent removal, and reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan in effect, including judicial determinations that reasonable efforts are not required, must be explicitly documented and must be made on a case-by-case basis and so stated in the court order.

(1) If the reasonable efforts and contrary to the welfare judicial determinations are not included as required in the court orders identified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, a transcript of the court proceedings is the only other documentation that will be accepted to verify that these required determinations have been made.

(2) Neither affidavits nor nunc pro tunc orders will be accepted as verification documentation in support of reasonable efforts and contrary to the welfare judicial determinations.

(3) Court orders that reference State law to substantiate judicial determinations are not acceptable, even if State law provides that a removal must be based on a judicial determination that remaining in the home would be contrary to the child's welfare or that removal can only be ordered after reasonable efforts have been made.

(e) Trial home visits. A trial home visit may not exceed six months in duration, unless a court orders a longer trial home visit. If a trial home visit extends beyond six months and has not been authorized by the court, or exceeds the time period the court has deemed appropriate, and the child is subsequently returned to foster care, that placement must then be considered a new placement and title IV-E eligibility must be newly established. Under these circumstances the judicial determinations regarding contrary to the welfare and reasonable efforts to prevent removal are required.

(f) Case review system. In order to satisfy the provisions of section 471(a)(16) of the Act regarding a case review system, each State's case review system must meet the requirements of sections 475(5) and 475(6) of the Act.

(g) Case plan requirements. In order to satisfy the case plan requirements of sections 471(a)(16), 475(1) and 475(5) (A) and (D) of the Act, the State agency must promulgate policy materials and instructions for use by State and local staff to determine the appropriateness of and necessity for the foster care placement of the child. The case plan for each child must:

(1) Be a written document, which is a discrete part of the case record, in a format determined by the State, which is developed jointly with the parent(s) or guardian of the child in foster care; and

(2) Be developed within a reasonable period, to be established by the State, but in no event later than 60 days from the child's removal from the home pursuant to paragraph (k) of this section;

(3) Include a discussion of how the case plan is designed to achieve a safe placement for the child in the least restrictive (most family-like) setting available and in close proximity to the home of the parent(s) when the case plan goal is reunification and a discussion of how the placement is consistent with the best interests and special needs of the child. (FFP is not available when a court orders a placement with a specific foster care provider);

(4) Include a description of the services offered and provided to prevent removal of the child from the home and to reunify the family; and

(5) Document the steps to finalize a placement when the case plan goal is or becomes adoption or placement in another permanent home in accordance with sections 475(1)(E) and (5)(E) of the Act. When the case plan goal is adoption, at a minimum, such documentation shall include child-specific recruitment efforts such as the use of State, regional, and national adoption exchanges including electronic exchange systems.
(This requirement has been approved by the Office of Management and Budget under OMB Control Number 0980–0140. In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.)
(h) Application of the permanency hearing requirements. (1) To meet the requirements of the permanency hearing, the State must, among other requirements, comply with section 475(5)(C) of the Act.

(2) In accordance with paragraph (b)(3) of this section, when a court determines that reasonable efforts to return the child home are not required, a permanency hearing must be held within 30 days of that determination, unless the requirements of the permanency hearing are fulfilled at the hearing in which the court determines that reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family are not required.

(3) If the State concludes, after considering reunification, adoption, legal guardianship, or permanent placement with a fit and willing relative, that the most appropriate permanency plan for a child is placement in another planned permanent living arrangement, the State must document to the court the compelling reason for the alternate plan. Examples of a compelling reason for establishing such a permanency plan may include:

(i) The case of an older teen who specifically requests that emancipation be established as his/her permanency plan;

(ii) The case of a parent and child who have a significant bond but the parent is unable to care for the child because of an emotional or physical disability and the child's foster parents have committed to raising him/her to the age of majority and to facilitate visitation with the disabled parent; or,

(iii) the Tribe has identified another planned permanent living arrangement for the child.

(4) When an administrative body, appointed or approved by the court, conducts the permanency hearing, the procedural safeguards set forth in the definition of permanency hearing must be so extended by the administrative body.

(i) Application of the requirements for filing a petition to terminate parental rights at section 475(5)(E) of the Social Security Act. (1) Subject to the exceptions in paragraph (i)(2) of this section, the State must file a petition (or, if such a petition has been filed by another party, seek to be joined as a party to the petition) to terminate the parental rights of a parent(s):

(i) Whose child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months. The petition must be filed by the end of the child's fifteenth month in foster care. In calculating when to file a petition for termination of parental rights, the State:

(A) Must calculate the 15 out of the most recent 22 month period from the date the child is considered to have entered foster care as defined at section 475(5)(F) of the Act and §1355.20 of this part;

(B) Must use a cumulative method of calculation when a child experiences multiple exits from and entries into foster care during the 22 month period;

(C) Must not include trial home visits or runaway episodes in calculating 15 months in foster care; and,

(D) Need only apply section 475(5)(E) of the Act to a child once if the State does not file a petition because one of the exceptions at paragraph (i)(2) of this section applies;

(ii) Whose child has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be an abandoned infant (as defined under State law). The petition to terminate parental rights must be filed within 60 days of the judicial determination that the child is an abandoned infant; or,

(iii) Who has been convicted of one of the felonies listed at paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this section. Under such circumstances, the petition to terminate parental rights must be filed within 60 days of a judicial determination that reasonable efforts to reunify the child and parent are not required.

(2) The State may elect not to file or join a petition to terminate the parental rights of a parent per paragraph (i)(1) of this section if:

(i) At the option of the State, the child is being cared for by a relative;

(ii) The State agency has documented in the case plan (which must be available for court review) a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the individual child. Compelling reasons for not filing a petition to terminate parental rights include, but are not limited to:

(A) Adoption is not the appropriate permanency goal for the child; or,

(B) No grounds to file a petition to terminate parental rights exist; or,

(C) The child is an unaccompanied refugee minor as defined in 45 CFR 400.111; or

(D) There are international legal obligations or compelling foreign policy reasons that would preclude terminating parental rights; or

(iii) The State agency has not provided to the family, consistent with the time period in the case plan, services that the State deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the home, when reasonable efforts to reunify the family are required.

(3) When the State files or joins a petition to terminate parental rights in accordance with paragraph (i)(1) of this section, it must concurrently begin to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified adoptive family for the child.

(j) Child of a minor parent in foster care. Foster care maintenance payments made on behalf of a child placed in a foster family home or child care institution, who is the parent of a son or daughter in the same home or institution, must include amounts which are necessary to cover costs incurred on behalf of the child's son or daughter. Said costs must be limited to funds expended on items listed in the definition of foster care maintenance payments in §1355.20 of this part.

(k) Removal from the home of a specified relative. (1) For the purposes of meeting the requirements of section 472(a)(1) of the Act, a removal from the home must occur pursuant to:

(i) A voluntary placement agreement entered into by a parent or guardian which leads to a physical or constructive removal (i.e., a non-physical or paper removal of custody) of the child from the home; or

(ii) A judicial order for a physical or constructive removal of the child from a parent or specified relative.

(2) A removal has not occurred in situations where legal custody is removed from the parent or relative and the child remains with the same relative in that home under supervision by the State agency.

(3) A child is considered constructively removed on the date of the first judicial order removing custody, even temporarily, from the appropriate specified relative or the date that the voluntary placement agreement is signed by all relevant parties.

(l) Living with a specified relative.For purposes of meeting the requirements for living with a specified relative prior to removal from the home under section 472(a)(1) of the Act and all of the conditions under section 472(a)(4), one of the two following situations must apply:

(1) The child was living with the parent or specified relative, and was AFDC eligible in that home in the month of the voluntary placement agreement or initiation of court proceedings; or

(2) The child had been living with the parent or specified relative within six months of the month of the voluntary placement agreement or the initiation of court proceedings, and the child would have been AFDC eligible in that month if s/he had still been living in that home.

(m) Review of payments and licensing standards. In meeting the requirements of section 471(a)(11) of the Act, the State must review at reasonable, specific, time-limited periods to be established by the State:

(1) The amount of the payments made for foster care maintenance and adoption assistance to assure their continued appropriateness; and

(2) The licensing or approval standards for child care institutions and foster family homes.

(n) Foster care goals. The specific foster care goals required under section 471(a)(14) of the Act must be incorporated into State law by statute or administrative regulation with the force of law.

(o) Notice and opportunity to be heard. The State must provide the foster parent(s) of a child and any preadoptive parent or relative providing care for the child with timely notice of and an opportunity to be heard in permanency hearings and six-month periodic reviews held with respect to the child during the time the child is in the care of such foster parent, preadoptive parent, or relative caregiver. Notice of and an opportunity to be heard does not include the right to standing as a party to the case.

[65 FR 4088, Jan. 25, 2000, as amended at 66 FR 58677, Nov. 23, 2001]

§ 1356.22 Implementation requirements for children voluntarily placed in foster care.
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(a) As a condition of receipt of Federal financial participation (FFP) in foster care maintenance payments for a dependent child removed from his home under a voluntary placement agreement, the State must meet the requirements of:

(1) Section 472 of the Act, as amended;

(2) Sections 422(b)(10) and 475(5) of the Act;

(3) 45 CFR 1356.21(e), (f), (g), (h), and (i); and

(4) The requirements of this section.

(b) Federal financial participation is available only for voluntary foster care maintenance expenditures made within the first 180 days of the child's placement in foster care unless there has been a judicial determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, within the first 180 days of such placement, to the effect that the continued voluntary placement is in the best interests of the child.

(c) The State agency must establish and maintain a uniform procedure or system, consistent with State law, for revocation by the parent(s) of a voluntary placement agreement and return of the child.

[65 FR 4090, Jan. 25, 2000, as amended at 66 FR 58677, Nov. 23, 2001]

§ 1356.30 Safety requirements for foster care and adoptive home providers.
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(a) Unless an election provided for in paragraph (d) of this section is made, the State must provide documentation that criminal records checks have been conducted with respect to prospective foster and adoptive parents.

(b) The State may not approve or license any prospective foster or adoptive parent, nor may the State claim FFP for any foster care maintenance or adoption assistance payment made on behalf of a child placed in a foster home operated under the auspices of a child placing agency or on behalf of a child placed in an adoptive home through a private adoption agency, if the State finds that, based on a criminal records check conducted in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section, a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that the prospective foster or adoptive parent has been convicted of a felony involving:

(1) Child abuse or neglect;

(2) Spousal abuse;

(3) A crime against a child or children (including child pornography); or,

(4) A crime involving violence, including rape, sexual assault, or homicide, but not including other physical assault or battery.

(c) The State may not approve or license any prospective foster or adoptive parent, nor may the State claim FFP for any foster care maintenance or adoption assistance payment made on behalf of a child placed in a foster home operated under the auspices of a child placing agency or on behalf of a child placed in an adoptive home through a private adoption agency, if the State finds, based on a criminal records check conducted in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section, that a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that the prospective foster or adoptive parent has, within the last five years, been convicted of a felony involving:

(1) Physical assault;

(2) Battery; or,

(3) A drug-related offense.

(d)(1) The State may elect not to conduct or require criminal records checks on prospective foster or adoptive parents by:

(i) Notifying the Secretary in a letter from the Governor; or

(ii) Enacting State legislation.

(2) Such an election also removes the State's obligation to comport with paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section.

(e) In all cases where the State opts out of the criminal records check requirement, the licensing file for that foster or adoptive family must contain documentation which verifies that safety considerations with respect to the caretaker(s) have been addressed.

(f) In order for a child care institution to be eligible for title IV-E funding, the licensing file for the institution must contain documentation which verifies that safety considerations with respect to the staff of the institution have been addressed.

[65 FR 4090, Jan. 25, 2000]

§ 1356.40 Adoption assistance program: Administrative requirements to implement section 473 of the Act.
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(a) To implement the adoption assistance program provisions of the title IV-E State plan and to be eligible for Federal financial participation in adoption assistance payments under this part, the State must meet the requirements of this section and sections 471(a), 473 and 475(3) of the Act.

(b) The adoption assistance agreement for payments pursuant to section 473(a)(2) must meet the requirements of section 475(3) of the Act and must:

(1) Be signed and in effect at the time of or prior to the final decree of adoption. A copy of the signed agreement must be given to each party; and

(2) Specify its duration; and

(3) Specify the nature and amount of any payment, services and assistance to be provided under such agreement and, for purposes of eligibility under title XIX of the Act, specify that the child is eligible for Medicaid services; and

(4) Specify, with respect to agreements entered into on or after October 1, 1983, that the agreement shall remain in effect regardless of the State of which the adoptive parents are residents at any given time.

(c) There must be no income eligibility requirement (means test) for the prospective adoptive parent(s) in determining eligibility for adoption assistance payments.

(d) In the event an adoptive family moves from one State to another State, the family may apply for social services on behalf of the adoptive child in the new State of residence. However, for agreements entered into on or after October 1, 1983, if a needed service(s) specified in the adoption assistance agreement is not available in the new State of residence, the State making the original adoption assistance payment remains financially responsible for providing the specified service(s).

(e) A State may make an adoption assistance agreement with adopting parent(s) who reside in another State. If so, all provisions of this section apply.

(f) The State agency must actively seek ways to promote the adoption assistance program.

[48 FR 23116, May 23, 1983, as amended at 53 FR 50220, Dec. 14, 1988]

§ 1356.41 Nonrecurring expenses of adoption.
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(a) The amount of the payment made for nonrecurring expenses of adoption shall be determined through agreement between the adopting parent(s) and the State agency administering the program. The agreement must indicate the nature and amount of the nonrecurring expenses to be paid.

(b) The agreement for nonrecurring expenses may be a separate document or a part of an agreement for either State or Federal adoption assistance payments or services. The agreement for nonrecurring expenses must be signed prior to the final decree of adoption, with two exceptions:

(1) Cases in which the final decree of adoption was entered into on or after January 1, 1987 and within six months after the effective date of the final rule; or

(2) Cases in which a final decree was entered into before January 1, 1987 but nonrecurring adoption expenses were paid after January 1, 1987.

(c) There must be no income eligibility requirement (means test) for adopting parents in determining whether payments for nonrecurring expenses of adoption shall be made. However, parents cannot be reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses for which they have otherwise been reimbursed.

(d) For purposes of payment of nonrecurring expenses of adoption, the State must determine that the child is a “child with special needs” as defined in section 473(c) of the Act, and that the child has been placed for adoption in accordance with applicable State and local laws; the child need not meet the categorical eligibility requirements at section 473(a)(2).

(e)(1) The State agency must notify all appropriate courts and all public and licensed private nonprofit adoption agencies of the availability of funds for the nonrecurring expenses of adoption of children with special needs as well as where and how interested persons may apply for these funds. This information should routinely be made available to all persons who inquire about adoption services after the publication date of this final rule.

(2) The State agency must send a notice to all public and private nonprofit adoption agencies directing them to notify all their clients who adopted a special needs child between January 1, 1986 and six months following the effective date of this rule of the availability of reimbursement for nonrecurring expenses paid after January 1, 1987.

(3) For adoptions in which a final decree is entered between January 1, 1987 and six months after the effective date of this rule, or where a final decree was entered before January 1, 1987 but nonrecurring adoption expenses were paid after January 1, 1987, individuals who seek reimbursement must enter into an agreement with the State agency and file a claim with the State agency within two years of the effective date of this rule. For adoptions in which a final decree is entered more than six months after the effective date of this rule, the agreement must be signed at the time of or prior to the final decree of adoption. In such cases, claims must be filed with the State agency within two years of the date of the final decree of adoption.

(f)(1) Funds expended by the State under an adoption assistance agreement, with respect to nonrecurring adoption expenses incurred by or on behalf of parents who adopt a child with special needs, shall be considered an administrative expenditure of the title IV-E Adoption Assistance Program. Federal reimbursement is available at a 50 percent matching rate, for State expenditures up to $2,000, for any adoptive placement.

(2) States may set a reasonable lower maximum which must be based on reasonable charges, consistent with State and local practices, for special needs adoptions within the State. The basis for setting a lower maximum must be documented and available for public inspection.

(3) In cases where siblings are placed and adopted, either separately or as a unit, each child is treated as an individual with separate reimbursement for nonrecurring expenses up to the maximum amount allowable for each child.

(g) Federal financial participation for nonrecurring expenses of adoption is limited to costs incurred by or on behalf of adoptive parents that are not otherwise reimbursed from other sources. Payments for nonrecurring expenses shall be made either directly by the State agency or through another public or licensed nonprofit private agency.

(h) When the adoption of the child involves interstate placement, the State that enters into an adoption assistance agreement under section 473(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act or under a State subsidy program will be responsible for paying the nonrecurring adoption expenses of the child. In cases where there is interstate placement but no agreement for other Federal or State adoption assistance, the State in which the final adoption decree is issued will be responsible for reimbursement of nonrecurring expenses if the child meets the requirements of section 473(c).

(i) The term “nonrecurring adoption expenses” means reasonable and necessary adoption fees, court costs, attorney fees and other expenses which are directly related to the legal adoption of a child with special needs, which are not incurred in violation of State or Federal law, and which have not been reimbursed from other sources or other funds. “Other expenses which are directly related to the legal adoption of a child with special needs” means the costs of the adoption incurred by or on behalf of the parents and for which parents carry the ultimate liability for payment. Such costs may include the adoption study, including health and psychological examination, supervision of the placement prior to adoption, transportation and the reasonable costs of lodging and food for the child and/or the adoptive parents when necessary to complete the placement or adoption process.

(j) When State statutes must be amended in order to reimburse parents for nonrecurring expenses in the adoption of eligible children, legislation must be enacted before the close of the second general session following publication of the final rule and must apply retroactively to January 1, 1987. Failure to honor all eligible claims will be considered non-compliance by the State with Title IV-E of the Act.

(k) A State expenditure is considered made in the quarter during which the payment was made by a State agency to a private nonprofit agency, individual or vendor payee.

[53 FR 50220, Dec. 14, 1988]

§ 1356.50 Withholding of funds for non-compliance with the approved title IV-E State plan.
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(a) To be in compliance with the title IV-E State plan requirements, a State must meet the requirements of the Act and 45 CFR 1356.20, 1356.21, 1356.30, and 1356.40 of this part.

(b) To be in compliance with the title IV-E State plan requirements, a State that chooses to claim FFP for voluntary placements must meet the requirements of the Act, 45 CFR 1356.22 and paragraph (a) of this section; and

(c) For purposes of this section, the procedures in §1355.39 of this chapter apply.

[48 FR 23117, May 23, 1983, as amended at 65 FR 4091, Jan. 25, 2000; 66 FR 58677, Nov. 23, 2001]

§ 1356.60 Fiscal requirements (title IV-E).
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(a) Federal matching funds for foster care maintenance and adoption assistance payments. (1) Effective October 1, 1980, Federal financial participation (FFP) is available to States under an approved title IV-E State plan for allowable costs in expenditures for:

(i) Foster care maintenance payments as defined in section 475(4) of the Act, made in accordance with 45 CFR 1356.20 through 1356.30 of this part, section 472 of the Act and section 102(d) of Pub. L. 96–272, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980;

(ii) Adoption assistance payments made in accordance with 45 CFR 1356.20 and 1356.40 and sections 473 and 475(3) of the Act.

(2) Federal financial participation is available at the rate of the Federal medical assistance percentage as defined in section 1905(b) of the Act, Definitions, and pertinent regulations as promulgated by the Secretary, or his designee.

(b) Federal matching funds for State and local training for foster care and adoption assistance under title IV-E. (1) Federal financial participation is available at the rate of seventy-five percent (75%) in the costs of:

(i) Training personnel employed or preparing for employment by the State or local agency administering the plan, and;

(ii) Providing short-term training (including travel and per diem expenses) to current or prospective foster or adoptive parents and the members of the state licensed or approved child care institutions providing care to foster and adopted children receiving title IV-E assistance.

(2) All training activities and costs funded under title IV-E shall be included in the State agency's training plan for title IV-B.

(3) Short and long term training at educational institutions and in-service training may be provided in accordance with the provisions of §§235.63 through 235.66(a) of this title.

(c) Federal matching funds for other State and local administrative expenditures for foster care and adoption assistance under title IV-E. Federal financial participation is available at the rate of fifty percent (50%) for administrative expenditures necessary for the proper and efficient administration of the title IV-E State plan. The State's cost allocation plan shall identify which costs are allocated and claimed under this program.

(1) The determination and redetermination of eligibility, fair hearings and appeals, rate setting and other costs directly related only to the administration of the foster care program under this part are deemed allowable administrative costs under this paragraph. They may not be claimed under any other section or Federal program.

(2) The following are examples of allowable administrative costs necessary for the administration of the foster care program:

(i) Referral to services;

(ii) Preparation for and participation in judicial determinations;

(iii) Placement of the child;

(iv) Development of the case plan;

(v) Case reviews;

(vi) Case management and supervision;

(vii) Recruitment and licensing of foster homes and institutions;

(viii) Rate setting; and

(ix) A proportionate share of related agency overhead.

(x) Costs related to data collection and reporting.

(3) Allowable administrative costs do not include the costs of social services provided to the child, the child's family or foster family which provide counseling or treatment to ameliorate or remedy personal problems, behaviors or home conditions.

(d) Cost of the data collection system. (1) Costs related to data collection system initiation, implementation and operation may be charged as an administrative cost of title IV-E at the 50 percent matching rate subject to the restrictions in paragraph (d) (2) of this section

(2) For information systems used for purposes other than those specified by section 479 of the Act, costs must be allocated and must bear the same ratio as the foster care and adoption population bears to the total population contained in the information system as verified by reports from all other programs included in the system.

(e) Federal matching funds for SACWIS. All expenditures of a State to plan, design, develop, install and operate the Statewide automated child welfare information system approved under §1355.52 of this chapter, shall be treated as necessary for the proper and efficient administration of the State plan without regard to whether the system may be used with respect to foster or adoptive children other than those on behalf of whom foster care maintenance or adoption assistance payments may be made under this part.

[47 FR 30925, July 15, 1982, as amended at 48 FR 23117, May 23, 1983; 53 FR 50221, Dec. 14, 1988; 58 FR 67938, 67947, Dec. 22, 1993; 65 FR 4091, Jan. 25, 2000; 66 FR 58677, Nov. 23, 2001]

§§ 1356.65-1356.70 [Reserved]
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§ 1356.71 Federal review of the eligibility of children in foster care and the eligibility of foster care providers in title IV-E programs.
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(a) Purpose, scope and overview of the process. (1) This section sets forth requirements governing Federal reviews of State compliance with the title IV-E eligibility provisions as they apply to children and foster care providers under paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 472 of the Act.

(2) The requirements of this section apply to State agencies that receive Federal payments for foster care under title IV-E of the Act.

(3) The review process begins with a primary review of foster care cases for the title IV-E eligibility requirements.

(i) States in substantial compliance. States determined to be in substantial compliance based on the primary review will be subject to another review in three years.

(ii) States not in substantial compliance. States that are determined not to be in substantial compliance based on the primary review will develop and implement a program improvement plan designed to correct the areas of noncompliance. A secondary review will be conducted after the completion of the program improvement plan. A subsequent primary review will be held three years from the date of the secondary review.

(b) Composition of review team and preliminary activities preceding an on-site review. (1) The review team must be composed of representatives of the State agency, and ACF's Regional and Central Offices.

(2) The State must provide ACF with the complete payment history for each of the sample and oversample cases prior to the on-site review.

(c) Sampling guidance and conduct of review. (1) The list of sampling units in the target population (i.e., the sampling frame) will be drawn by ACF statistical staff from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data which are transmitted by the State agency to ACF. The sampling frame will consist of cases of children who were eligible for foster care maintenance payments during the reporting period reflected in a State's most recent AFCARS data submission. For the initial primary review, if these data are not available or are deficient, an alternative sampling frame, consistent with one AFCARS six-month reporting period, will be selected by ACF in conjunction with the State agency.

(2) A sample of 80 cases (plus a 10 percent oversample of eight cases) from the title IV-E foster care program will be selected for the primary review utilizing probability sampling methodologies. Usually, the chosen methodology will be simple random sampling, but other probability samples may be utilized, when necessary and appropriate.

(3) Cases from the oversample will be substituted and reviewed for each of the original sample of 80 cases which is found to be in error.

(4) At the completion of the primary review, the review team will determine the number of ineligible cases. When the total number of ineligible cases does not exceed eight, ACF can conclude with a probability of 88 percent that in a population of 1000 or more cases the population ineligibility case error rate is less than 15 percent and the State will be considered in substantial compliance. For primary reviews held subsequent to the initial primary reviews, the acceptable population ineligibility case error rate threshold will be reduced from less than 15 percent (eight or fewer ineligible cases) to less than 10 percent (four or fewer ineligible cases)). A State agency which meets this standard is considered to be in “substantial compliance” (see paragraph (h) of this section). A disallowance will be assessed for the ineligible cases for the period of time the cases are ineligible.

(5) A State which has been determined to be in “noncompliance” (i.e., not in substantial compliance) will be required to develop a program improvement plan according to the specifications discussed in paragraph (i) of this section, as well as undergo a secondary review. For the secondary review, a sample of 150 cases (plus a 10 percent oversample of 15 cases) will be drawn from the most recent AFCARS submission. Usually, the chosen methodology will be simple random sampling, but other probability samples may be utilized, when necessary and appropriate. Cases from the oversample will be substituted and reviewed for each of the original sample of 150 cases which is found to be in error.

(6) At the completion of the secondary review, the review team will calculate both the sample case ineligibility and dollar error rates for the cases determined ineligible during the review. An extrapolated disallowance equal to the lower limit of a 90 percent confidence interval for the population total dollars in error for the amount of time corresponding to the AFCARS reporting period will be assessed if both the child/provider (case) ineligibility and dollar error rates exceed 10 percent. If neither, or only one, of the error rates exceeds 10 percent, a disallowance will be assessed for the ineligible cases for the period of time the cases are ineligible.

(d) Requirements subject to review. States will be reviewed against the requirements of title IV-E of the Act regarding:

(1) The eligibility of the children on whose behalf the foster care maintenance payments are made (section 472(a)(1)–(4) of the Act) to include:

(i) Judicial determinations regarding “reasonable efforts” and “contrary to the welfare” in accordance with §1356.21(b) and (c), respectively;

(ii) Voluntary placement agreements in accordance with §1356.22;

(iii) Responsibility for placement and care vested with the State agency;

(iv) Placement in a licensed foster family home or child care institution; and,

(v) eligibility for AFDC under such State plan as it was in effect on July 16, 1996.

(2) Allowable payments made to foster care providers who comport with sections 471(a)(10), 471(a)(20), 472(b) and (c) of the Act and §1356.30.

(e) Review instrument. A title IV-E foster care eligibility review checklist will be used when conducting the eligibility review.

(f) Eligibility determination—child. The case record of the child must contain sufficient documentation to verify a child's eligibility in accordance with paragraph (d)(1) of this section, in order to substantiate payments made on the child's behalf.

(g) Eligibility determination—provider. (1) For each case being reviewed, the State agency must make available a licensing file which contains the licensing history, including a copy of the certificate of licensure/approval or letter of approval, for each of the providers in the following categories:

(i) Public child care institutions with 25 children or less in residence;

(ii) Private child care institutions;

(iii) Group homes; and

(iv) Foster family homes, including relative homes.

(2) The licensing file must contain documentation that the State has complied with the safety requirements for foster and adoptive placements in accordance with §1356.30.

(3) If the licensing file does not contain sufficient information to support a child's placement in a licensed facility, the State agency may provide supplemental information from other sources (e.g., a computerized database).

(h) Standards of compliance. (1) Disallowances will be taken, and plans for program improvement required, based on the extent to which a State is not in substantial compliance with recipient or provider eligibility provisions of title IV-E, or applicable regulations in 45 CFR parts 1355 and 1356.

(2) Substantial compliance and noncompliance are defined as follows:

(i) Substantial compliance—For the primary review (of the sample of 80 cases), no more than eight of the title IV-E cases reviewed may be determined to be ineligible. (This critical number of allowable “errors,” i.e., ineligible cases, is reduced to four errors or less in primary reviews held subsequent to the initial primary review). For the secondary review (if required), substantial compliance means either the case ineligibility or dollar error rate does not exceed 10 percent.

(ii) Noncompliance—means not in substantial compliance. For the primary review (of the sample of 80 cases), nine or more of the title IV-E cases reviewed must be determined to be ineligible. (This critical number of allowable “errors,” i.e., ineligible cases, is reduced to five or more in primary reviews subsequent to the initial primary review). For the secondary review (if required), noncompliance means both the case ineligibility and dollar error rates exceed 10 percent.

(3) ACF will notify the State in writing within 30 calendar days after the completion of the review of whether the State is, or is not, operating in substantial compliance.

(4) States which are determined to be in substantial compliance must undergo a subsequent review after a minimum of three years.

(i) Program improvement plans. (1) States which are determined to be in noncompliance with recipient or provider eligibility provisions of title IV-E, or applicable regulations in 45 CFR Parts 1355 and 1356, will develop a program improvement plan designed to correct the areas determined not to be in substantial compliance. The program improvement plan will:

(i) Be developed jointly by State and Federal staff;

(ii) Identify the areas in which the State's program is not in substantial compliance;

(iii) Not extend beyond one year. A State will have a maximum of one year in which to implement and complete the provisions of the program improvement plan unless State legislative action is required. In such instances, an extension may be granted with the State and ACF negotiating the terms and length of such extension that shall not exceed the last day of the first legislative session after the date of the program improvement plan; and

(iv) Include:

(A) Specific goals;

(B) The action steps required to correct each identified weakness or deficiency; and,

(C) a date by which each of the action steps is to be completed.

(2) States determined not to be in substantial compliance as a result of a primary review must submit the program improvement plan to ACF for approval within 90 calendar days from the date the State receives written notification that it is not in substantial compliance. This deadline may be extended an additional 30 calendar days when a State agency submits additional documentation to ACF in support of cases determined to be ineligible as a result of the on-site eligibility review.

(3) The ACF Regional Office will intermittently review, in conjunction with the State agency, the State's progress in completing the prescribed action steps in the program improvement plan.

(4) If a State agency does not submit an approvable program improvement plan in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (i)(1) and (2) of this section, ACF will move to a secondary review in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section.

(j) Disallowance of funds. The amount of funds to be disallowed will be determined by the extent to which a State is not in substantial compliance with recipient or provider eligibility provisions of title IV-E, or applicable regulations in 45 CFR parts 1355 and 1356.

(1) States which are in found to be in substantial compliance during the primary or secondary review will have disallowances (if any) determined on the basis of individual cases reviewed and found to be in error. The amount of disallowance will be computed on the basis of payments associated with ineligible cases for the entire period of time that each case has been ineligible.

(2) States which are found to be in noncompliance during the primary review will have disallowances determined on the basis of individual cases reviewed and found to be in error, and must implement a program improvement plan in accordance with the provisions contained within it. A secondary review will be conducted no later than during the AFCARS reporting period which immediately follows the program improvement plan completion date on a sample of 150 cases drawn from the State's most recent AFCARS data. If both the case ineligibility and dollar error rates exceed 10 percent, the State is not in compliance and an additional disallowance will be determined based on extrapolation from the sample to the universe of claims paid for the duration of the AFCARS reporting period (i.e., all title IV-E funds expended for a case during the quarter(s) that case is ineligible, including administrative costs). If either the case ineligibility or dollar rate does not exceed 10 percent, the amount of disallowance will be computed on the basis of payments associated with ineligible cases for the entire period of time the case has been determined to be ineligible.

(3) The State agency will be liable for interest on the amount of funds disallowed by the Department, in accordance with the provisions of 45 CFR 30.13.

(4) States may appeal any disallowance actions taken by ACF to the HHS Departmental Appeals Board in accordance with regulations at 45 CFR Part 16.

[65 FR 4091, Jan. 25, 2000, as amended at 66 FR 58677, Nov. 23, 2001]

Title IV-E Federal Foster Care Eligibility Review

http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/fostercare/titleiv-e/chapter3.asp

The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) of the Department of Health and Human Services is required to conduct eligibility reviews every three years of a random sample of cases to determine whether the foster care costs charged to the federal Title IV-E program are appropriate. Federal regulation, 45 CFR 1356.71 provides for a Program Improvement Plan (PIP) process for states found not to be in substantial compliance with the Second Primary Eligibility Review or any subsequent reviews. In addition, federal disallowances are taken for the sample cases that are found to be out-of-compliance. The state has a maximum of one year in which to implement and complete the PIP unless state legislation is required. At the end of the PIP period, ACF conducts a Secondary Eligibility Review. If a state exceeds the error threshold for the case error rate and the dollar error rate, the federal government may impose a disallowance related to the state's entire Title IV-E claims.

The Subsequent Primary Eligibility Review for New York State was held the week of August 31 to September 4, 2009. The results of this review showed that New York State was found to be in substantial compliance. During the Subsequent Primary review, 80 cases were reviewed and 2 were determined to be error cases. A disallowance in the amount of $14,404.00 in maintenance payments and $28,641.00 in associated administrative costs were assessed for these error cases. An additional 15 cases contained payments that were improperly claimed. Although these cases are not considered "error cases" for determining substantial compliance, a disallowance in the amount of $103,195.00 in maintenance payments and $92,106.00 in associated administrative costs were assessed for these ineligible payments. Since OCFS was found to be in substantial compliance, a secondary review is not required. The next primary review will be held within three years.

ACF commended OCFS for its continuous efforts to improve its Title IV-E foster care eligibility program since the previous secondary review that was conducted in August 2006. ACF noted overall improvements in the timeliness of judicial findings and an improvement in the quality of written court orders. Also noted were court orders that addressed the Indian Child Welfare Act for children who are affiliated with Native American or tribal groups. The use of standardized court orders statewide strengthens the State’s ability to achieve better permanency outcomes for children in foster care.

In an effort to support our ongoing commitment to assist local districts in their efforts with compliance with federal Title IV-E requirements, OCFS will continue its partnership with local districts and regional office staff. Training is being updated to reflect changes brought about by the recent review as well as changes from recently enacted federal legislation. All local district staff, regardless of their tenure with the county, are strongly encouraged to attend the various Title IV-E training classes to learn of the changes and updates to Title IV-E eligibility, requirements and claiming. Technical assistance remains available as needed.
•For more specific details on the federal report and its findings, click on the link to take you directly to the report

10-OCFS-LCM-02 Federal Administration for Children and Families’ Final Report on the 2009 Title IV-E Subsequent Primary Foster Care Eligibility Review

Administration for Children and Families FCER Review Instrument
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/cwmonitoring/general_info/instrument.htm
Districts should note that the Review Instrument, which is included within the Title IV-E Foster Care Eligibility On-Site Review Instrument and Instructions, is in the process of being updated from its current 2006 version. This new version will be posted to the OCFS Title IV-E website as soon as it becomes available.

Administration for Children and Families (ACF) Web Site
For information on the Foster Care eligibility review process, visit the ACF web page located at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws_policies/policy/im/2001/im0111a1_2007.htm

Court Related Standards and Reasonable Efforts Issues
Title IV-E Foster Care Eligibility: Court Related Standards (PDF) - This document outlines federal Title IV-E eligibility standards that involve the court and addresses compliance issues relating to those standards.

Reasonable Efforts Issues (PDF)
The federal Title IV-E standards require a case specific court determination within 60 days of removal whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal or were not required.

The Office of Court Administration
The use of the court forms developed by the New York State Office of Court Administration will help increase the likelihood of complying with federal Title IV-E court related standards required for Title IV-E eligibility